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I. INTRODUCTION
The environmental consciousness revolution of the 1970s was a
dominant political force in Washington. Between 1970 and 1972, a
sweeping array of innovative environmental regulatory programs
became law.' For example, the Shoreline Management Act2 estab-
lished state-supervised local planning and regulatory requirements for
the use and development of most of the state's bodies of water and
their shorelines and immediate uplands. Furthermore, the State
Environmental Policy Act3 (SEPA), perhaps the nation's most potent
"little NEPA," imposed a regime of environmental review on all state
and local government actions with potentially adverse environmental
consequences and conferred on all public agencies broad substantive
authority to protect and enhance the natural and "built" environment.
However, such progressive environmental regulatory laws operated as
overlays on local land use planning and regulation, and attempts to
reform4 Washington's antiquated patchwork of land use legislation'
failed. As a result, the state's environmentally-based land use regula-
tory laws rested on a faulty foundation.
Until the adoption of the Growth Management Act6 (GMA) in
1990, local land use planning and regulation was optional and, if
undertaken, was subject to modest state procedural standards and
virtually no substantive requirements at all. Counties and cities, to
1. See Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution in
Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867, 875 n.51 (1993).
2. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1998). See generally RICHARD L. SETTLE, WASHING-
TON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 4 (1983) [hereinafter
SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE]; Geoffrey Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management
Act of 1971, 49 WASH. L. REV. 423 (1974).
3. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C (1998). See generally RICHARD L. SETTLE, THE
WASHINGTON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
(1987, cum. supp. 1999) [hereinafter SETTLE, SEPA].
4. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1, at 875-76.
5. Id.
6. With some exceptions, the Growth Management Act is codified at title 36, chapter 70A
of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). [All citations to ch. 36.70A of the Revised Code of
Washington are to the 1998 edition unless otherwise indicated - Eds.]
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the extent they chose to plan and regulate land use, were not obligated
to coordinate or achieve consistency with the plans and regulations of
neighboring jurisdictions. There was no requirement that facilities of
regional importance be accommodated or that each locality allow for a
fair share of the region's housing needs. With the exception of"shorelines," local government had no obligation to protect environ-
mentally critical areas from the consequences of development. It was
purely a matter of local option to allow land suited for commercial
farming, forestry, or mining to be irreversibly converted to other uses.
The state did not require cities and counties to coordinate the provi-
sion of public facilities with new development, or to plan for the con-
centration of urban development in limited areas so that public
services and facilities could be efficiently provided.
The flawed foundation of Washington's environmental revolu-
tion began to crumble under the weight of burgeoning prosperity and
rapid growth during the 1980s. The booming economy did what the
advocates of environmental quality and good government had been
unable to do. Abstract policy arguments for land use regulatory
reform failed to sufficiently capture the interest of voters to gain the
legislature's attention. However, the economic boom of the 1980s, by
generating the worst traffic congestion in the west, escalating urban
skylines, bulldozing farms, decimating forests, and turning sparkling
salmon-bearing streams into storm sewers, converted hordes of for-
merly mild-mannered citizens into vocal activists. In 1988, these
activists sponsored the successful Seattle Citizens Alternative Plan
(CAP) initiative,7 limiting the height and intensity of and setting
annual quotas for new downtown office buildings. In 1989, they
demanded state growth management legislation.
While the champions of radical new state growth management
requirements for local governments were a powerful force, the defend-
ers of the status quo were potent adversaries. Revolutionary battles
were fought on many fronts, and the outcome was always in doubt.8
The governor's office, legislators, legislative committees, the Growth
Strategies Commission, and a plethora of interest groups skirmished
during a period extending from the 1989 through 1991 legislative
7. Concern over downtown development in Seattle culminated in the electorate's passage of
the CAP Initiative imposing height limitations and annual quotas for office buildings. See Ini-
tiative 31, Seattle, Wash., The Citizens Alternative Plan Initiative (passed May 16, 1989) (codi-
fied at SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE 323.49.011 (1989)). See also The Voters Put a Lid on It;
CAP Winners Savor the Message Sent to City Hall, SEATTLE TIMES, May 17, 1989, at Al. See
also Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1, at 871, 881.
8. See generally Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1.
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sessions, straddling a bitterly contested initiative campaign.' The
Growth Management Act that somehow survived the fierce legislative
gauntlet was enacted by the 1990 and 1991 legislatures in two install-
ments, known at the time as GMA 1" and GMA II.11 Because the
recommendations of the Growth Strategies commission were variously
embraced, rejected, and ignored by the wrangling legislature, the
GMA was not the finely-honed product of a law revision commis-
sion. 12  Both installments of the Act were riddled with politically
necessary omissions, internal inconsistencies, and vague language, 3
sometimes consciously designed to defer the final reckoning to another
day and, perhaps, another forum. Because the legislature declined to
grant substantive rulemaking authority to GMA's "godparent"
agency, 4 the meaning and effect of important and controversial ele-
ments of this revolutionary legislation were left to the three Growth
Management Hearings Boards (Growth Boards) established by GMA
I1,1' the courts, and future legislative amendments.
The Growth Boards now have interpreted, to some extent, the
procedural and substantive requirements of the Act. 6 The legislature
has amended the GMA every year since its enactment to modify or
clarify its requirements, sometimes in reaction to Growth Board deci-
sions. Courts generally have been last to enter the stage of Washing-
9. Id. at 881- 96.
10. Growth Management Act, 1990 Wash. Laws 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 17.
11. Growth Management Act (Revised Provisions), 1991 Wash. Laws 2902, 1st Spec.
Sess., ch. 32.
12. See generally Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.190(4)(b). Whether the State Department of
Community Development (now Community, Trade, and Economic Development) should be
given rulemaking authority was hotly contested in the legislative process. Finally, the agency
was given authority to adopt only "procedural criteria" and "guidelines." The GMA "proce-
dural criteria" were adopted on October 29, 1992, and are codified in chapter 365-195 of the
Washington Administrative Code (1999). See generally Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1, at 899.
15. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.250, .345.
16. See generally Richard L. Settle & Charles R. Wolfe, Filling Legislative Gaps in Wash-
ington's Growth Management Law, 50 LAND USE AND ZONING DIG. No. 2 (1998). Growth
Management Hearings Board decisions are available on Westlaw. To access a decision, log on to
Westlaw, then (1) choose "State Materials" as the database; (2) select "Washington"; (3) select
"Administrative and Executive Materials"; (4) then choose "Growth Management Hearings
Board Decisions" (WA-GMHB). Once in the WA-GMHB database, conduct a word, citation,
or other search. Growth management information is also available on the Internet. For an index
of Hearings Board decisions and other growth management information, visit the Washington
State Department of Community, Trade and Economic Development Home Page at
<http://www.wa.gov/cted/growth>. For legislative information and land use reports, visit the
Washington State Land Use Study Commission Home Page at <http://www.wa.gov/cted/
landuse>. For other environmental information, visit the Washington State Department of
Ecology Home Page at <http://www.wa.gov/ecology>.
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ton's growth management revolution, given their role in the review
process. Aside from a few cases deciding whether local enactments
implementing GMA requirements were subject to referendum" or
initiative," whether the GMA precluded municipal incorporation or
annexation, 19 whether the GMA foreclosed certain interim regulations
and moratoria,2" whether approvals of development proposals violated
the Act,21 and whether challenged GMA provisions were constitu-
tional,22 the meaning and effect of GMA requirements generally have
been adjudicated only after local GMA implementation measures have
been adopted by a county or city and appealed to a Growth Board.23
Given the time consumed by local GMA implementation processes,
Growth Board appeals, trial court proceedings, and reported decisions
of the Washington Court of Appeals and Supreme Court interpreting
GMA provisions are recent phenomena.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze and explain court deci-
sions in cases involving challenges to the GMA itself, Growth Board
rulings on local compliance, and GMA constraints on specific proj -
ects. Special emphasis will be given to the relative degrees of judicial
deference accorded to the decisions of local governments and Growth
Boards, respectively. Because most GMA requirements are concep-
tual, not definitive, and often ambiguous, a pervasive, recurring issue
is whether the legislature intended to authorize local governments or
the Growth Boards to fill in GMA's blanks, that is, to give specific
meaning to GMA's often broadly stated requirements. This Article
also addresses judicial resolution of issues concerning procedural
prerequisites to obtaining judicial review of GMA compliance. An
introductory overview of the Act's requirements provides context for
the case law analyses that follow.
17. See Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wash. 2d 345, 884 P.2d 1326 (1994); Snoho-
mish County v. Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d 151, 868 P.2d 116 (1994) [hereinafter Anderson 1].
18. See Save Our State Park v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs, 74 Wash. App. 637,
875 P.2d 673 (1994).
19. See Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. Washington State Boundary Review Bd.
for King County, 127 Wash. 2d 759, 903 P.2d 953 (1995) (incorporation); King County v.
Washington State Boundary Review Bd. for King County, 122 Wash. 2d 648, 860 P.2d 1024
(1994) (annexation).
20. See Matson v. Clark County Bd. of Comm'rs, 79 Wash. App. 641, 904 P.2d 317
(1995).
21. See King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d
374 (Wash. 1999); Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 947
P.2d 1208 (1997).
22. See Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wash. 2d 834, 881 P.2d 240 (1994) [herein-
after Anderson II]; Postema v. Snohomish County, 83 Wash. App. 574, 922 P.2d 176 (1996).
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300 (unless all parties have agreed to direct review in
superior court of a petition to a Growth Board). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.295.
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II. OVERVIEW OF GMA SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
This summary of the Act's substantive and procedural require-
ments is designed to set the stage for the court decisions that have
addressed growth management issues. While Growth Board interpre-
tations occasionally will be mentioned to put flesh on bare GMA
bones, comprehensive exposition of Board decisions is beyond the
scope of this Article.
With few exceptions,24 GMA requirements do not apply state-
wide, but only to counties meeting statutory criteria and to other
counties choosing to be bound by the Act.2" If a county is subject to
the GMA, so are all of its cities.26 By choice or mandate, twenty-nine
of the state's thirty-nine counties are governed by the GMA. Once a
county is subject to the GMA, there is no way out under the present
legislation.
A. Substantive Requirements
The substantive roots of Washington's growth management sys-
tem are thirteen "planning goals."27 The goals are to be used "exclu-
24. Several GMA requirements apply to non-GMA counties and cities: their development
regulations must be consistent with any adopted comprehensive plan. WASH. REV. CODE 9§
35.63.125, 35A.63.105, 36.70.545 (1998); they must designate and protectively regulate critical
areas, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.170, .060(2); and they must designate, but need not
protectively regulate, natural resource lands. Id. Neither GMA nor non-GMA local
governments may approve subdivisions and short subdivisions without adequate public facilities,
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 58.17.060, .110, nor building permits without adequate potable water
supplies, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.097 (1998).
25. As of December 1992, the GMA counties included: Benton, Chelan, Clallam, Clark,
Columbia, Douglas, Ferry, Franklin, Garfield, Grant, Island, Jefferson, King, Kitsap, Kittitas,
Mason, Pacific, Pend Oreille, Pierce, San Juan, Skagit, Snohomish, Thurston, Walla Walla,
Whatcom, and Yakima. Lewis and Spokane counties entered GMA's realm on July 1, 1993, by
reaching population and rate of growth thresholds. In September 1993 Stevens County chose to
become a GMA county. Approximately 95% of the state's population now resides in GMA
counties.
26. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(1).
27. See WASH. REV. CODE 36.70A.020:
Planning goals. The following goals are adopted to guide the development and adop-
tion of comprehensive plans and development regulations of those counties and cities
that are required or choose to plan under RCW 36.70A.040. The following goals are
not listed in order of priority and shall be used exclusively for the purpose of guiding
the development of comprehensive plans and development regulations:
(1) Urban growth. Encourage development in urban areas where adequate
public facilities and services exist or can be provided in an efficient manner.
(2) Reduce sprawl. Reduce the inappropriate conversion of undeveloped land
into sprawling, low-density development.
(3) Transportation. Encourage efficient multimodal transportation systems that
are based on regional priorities and coordinated with county and city compre-
hensive plans.
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sively for the purpose of guiding the development of comprehensive
plans and development regulations."2  Unlike some states' growth
management systems"9 and Washington's Shoreline Management
Act,3" the GMA does not require state administrative approval of local
plans and regulations. Thus, local fidelity to GMA goals is not sys-
tematically enforced, but depends upon appeals to the Growth Boards
and the courts.
The Act explicitly denies any order of priority among the thir-
teen goals, even though some of them are mutually competitive. This
is a matter of some irony because local comprehensive plans are
required to be internally consistent.31 However, the goals collectively
convey some conceptual guidance for growth management. The goals
call for carefully planned, compact, generally contiguous concentra-
tions of future development in "urban growth areas" that are ade-
(4) Housing. Encourage the availability of affordable housing to all economic
segments of the population of this state, promote a variety of residential densities
and housing types, and encourage preservation of existing housing stock.
(5) Economic development. Encourage economic development throughout the
state that is consistent with adopted comprehensive plans, promote economic
opportunity for all citizens of this state, especially for unemployed and for dis-
advantaged persons, and encourage growth in areas experiencing insufficient
economic growth, all within the capacities of the state's natural resources, public
services, and public facilities.
(6) Property rights. Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation having been made. The property rights of landowners shall
be protected from arbitrary and discriminatory actions.
(7) Permits. Applications for both state and local government permits should
be processed in a timely and fair manner to ensure predictability.
(8) Natural resource industries. Maintain and enhance natural resource-based
industries, including productive timber, agricultural, and fisheries industries.
Encourage the conservation of productive forest lands and productive agricul-
tural lands, and discourage incompatible uses.
(9) Open space and recreation. Encourage the retention of open space and
development of recreational opportunities, conserve fish and wildlife habitat,
increase access to natural resource lands and water, and develop parks.
(10) Environment. Protect the environment and enhance the state's high qual-
ity of life, including air and water quality, and the availability of water.
(11) Citizen participation and coordination. Encourage the involvement of citi-
zens in the planning process and ensure coordination between communities and
jurisdictions to reconcile conflicts.
(12) Public facilities and services. Ensure that those public facilities and serv-
ices necessary to support development shall be adequate to serve the develop-
ment at the time the development is available for occupancy and use without
decreasing current service levels below locally established minimum standards.
(13) Historic preservation. Identify and encourage the preservation of lands,
sites, and structures, that have historical or archaeological significance.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.217 (1997).
30. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.070(2), .090 (1998).
31. See id. § 36.70A.070.
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quately served by public facilities and services; viable natural
resource-based industries (e.g., timber, agriculture, and fishing) pro-
tected from urban development pressure and incompatible uses; high
levels of environmental quality; ample open space for recreation and
habitat; adequate affordable housing; preservation of historic sites;
protection of property rights from unfair burdens; extensive opportun-
ities for citizen participation in planning processes; expedited and fair
processing of development permit applications; and general encour-
agement of balanced economic development throughout the state.32
The extent to which the GMA goals are implemented by specific
substantive requirements varies significantly. The Act contains five
core substantive mandates that are prescribed with varying degrees of
specificity. First, new growth must be concentrated in Urban Growth
Areas (UGAs) that are contiguous with existing urbanized areas and
meeting other specified standards.33 Second, new development may
not be allowed unless adequate transportation, and perhaps other pub-
lic facilities, will be available concurrently with the development.34
Third, counties and cities may not exclude regionally essential public
facilities and must accommodate affordable housing.3" Fourth, envi-
ronmentally critical areas must be designated and protected.36 Finally,
natural resource lands of long-term commercial significance for agri-
cultural, forest product, and mining industries must be designated and
protected.37
1. Urban Growth Areas
The concentration of future growth into UGAs was borrowed
from the Oregon system 3' and is the Act's most controversial require-
ment.39 By directing most of the state's future population increase into
existing cities, urbanized areas, and other contiguous territory as
needed, the Act seeks to minimize intrusion into resource lands and
critical areas, preserve large tracts of open space easily accessible to
urban residents, foster a sense of spatial identity by separating com-
munities with great expanses of sparsely populated rural land, and
induce sufficient development density to be efficiently served by mass
transportation and other public facilities. This noble experiment will
32. See supra note 27.
33. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.020(1) and (2), 110.
34. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.020(12), .070(6).
35. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.200, .020(4),.070(2)(d).
36. See id. §§ 36.70A.020(10), .060, .170, .172, .175.
37. See id. §§ 36.70A.020(8), .060, .131, .170, .177.
38. See Settle & Wolfe, supra note 16, at 4.
39. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110.
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attempt to wean Washingtonians from the sprawling, low-density
development patterns that have prevailed throughout the nation since
World War II.
Counties have final authority to designate UGAs. However,
they are constrained by process requirements to assure that they nego-
tiate with affected cities. Counties were given this authority because
the Act mandates that all of the territory of existing cities be included
in UGAs and, hence, the land subject to discretionary UGA designa-
tion is in unincorporated county areas." However, cities are intensely
interested in UGA designation because it affects the nature and extent
of their future growth. Every ten years, the UGA designation process
must be repeated for the succeeding twenty-year period.41
In addition to extensive process constraints, county UGA desig-
nation is subject to major substantive requirements. The UGAs, in
which "urban densities" must be allowed and "greenbelt and open
space areas" must be included, must be sufficient to accommodate the
twenty year population projections of the state's Office of Financial
Management (OFM).42 Territory beyond city limits may be included
in UGAs only if it "already is characterized by urban growth," is
"adjacent to" such areas, or is a "new fully contained community."4 3
Isolated UGAs are authorized for "new fully contained communities"
as a narrow exception to the general requirement that UGAs be con-
tiguous to existing urban areas to preclude leapfrog development.44
Counties are authorized, but not obligated, to provide for such new
communities. If a county elects to do so, it must reserve an appropri-
ate portion of the twenty-year population projection and reduce its
initially designated urban growth areas accordingly.
The GMA granted similar, but conceptually distinct, authority
to allow "master planned resorts" in remote areas ineligible for UGA
designation.4" A county may allow such resorts in its comprehensive
plan and development regulations only if statutory criteria are met.46
Unlike "new fully contained communities," the sites of "master
planned resorts," once approved, are not designated as UGAs. The
40. See id. § 36.70A.110(1).
41. See id. § 36.70A.130(3).
42. See id. § 36.70A.110(2).
43. See id. §§ 36.70A.110(1), .350. RCW 36.70A.110(3) establishes an order of priority
between urban areas with and without sufficient excess public facilities to accommodate the pro-
jected growth. However, it is unclear whether this priority order pertains to designation of
UGAs or phased development within UGAs.
44. See id.
45. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.360.
46. See id. § 36.70A.360(1)-(5).
1999]
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apparent rationale is that they would be used primarily by transient
guests rather than additional residents of the state.
The Act calls for "urban growth" to be located within UGAs,
and allows growth outside of UGAs only if it is "not urban in
nature."47 However, the Act does not specify minimum standards of
development density or intensity for UGAs. Urban growth is vaguely
defined as that which involves intensive improvement of land incom-
patible with primary natural resource use, and which necessitates
"urban governmental services" when "allowed to spread over wide
areas." 48  Nor did the Act, as originally adopted, specify maximum
standards of density or intensity in rural areas, aside from the circular
provision that a "variety of rural densities. . . that are compatible with
the rural character" should be allowed.49  "Rural" was not defined.
However, a major 1997 amendment ° contains elaborate new guidance
on permissible development in rural areas.
47. See id. § 36.70A.110(1).
48. See id. §§ 36.70A.030(14), (16) ("Urban governmental services include those govern-
mental services historically and typically delivered by cities, and include storm and sanitary
sewer systems, domestic water systems, street cleaning services, fire and police protection serv-
ices, public transit services, and other public utilities associated with urban areas and normally
not associated with nonurban areas.").
49. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(5) (amended 1997).
50. RCW 36.70A.070(5), as amended by 1997 Wash. Laws ch. 429 § 7, now provides as
follows:
(5) Rural element. Counties shall include a rural element including lands that are not
designated for urban growth, agriculture, forest, or mineral resources. The following
provisions shall apply to the rural element:
(a) Growth management act goals and local circumstances. Because circum-
stances vary from county to county, in establishing patterns of rural densities
and uses, a county may consider local circumstances, but shall develop a written
record explaining how the rural element harmonizes the planning goals in RCW
36.70A.020 and meets the requirements of this chapter.
(b) Rural development. The rural element shall permit rural development, for-
estry, and agriculture in rural areas. The rural element shall provide for a vari-
ety of rural densities, uses, essential public facilities, and rural governmental
services needed to serve the permitted densities and uses. In order to achieve a
variety of rural densities and uses, counties may provide for clustering, density
transfer, design guidelines, conservation easements, and other innovative tech-
niques that will accommodate appropriate rural densities and uses that are not
characterized by urban growth and that are consistent with rural character.
(c) Measures governing rural development. The rural element shall include
measures that apply to rural development and protect the rural character of the
area, as established by the county, by:
(i) Containing or otherwise controlling rural development;
(ii) Assuring visual compatibility of rural development with the sur-
rounding rural area;
(iii) Reducing the inappropriate conversion of undeveloped land into
sprawling, low-density development in the rural area;
(iv) Protecting critical areas, as provided in RCW 36.70A.060, and surface
water and ground water resources; and
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(v) Protecting against conflicts with the use of agricultural, forest, and
mineral resource lands designated under RCW 36.70A. 170.
(d) Limited areas of more intensive rural development. Subject to the require-
ments of this subsection and except as otherwise specifically provided in this
subsection (5)(d), the rural element may allow for limited areas of more intensive
rural development, including necessary public facilities and public services to
serve the limited area as follows:
(i) Rural development consisting of the infill, development, or redevelop-
ment of existing commercial, industrial, residential, or mixed-use areas,
whether characterized as shoreline development, villages, hamlets, rural
activity centers, or crossroads developments. A commercial, industrial,
residential, shoreline, or mixed-use area shall be subject to the require-
ments of (d)(iv) of this subsection, but shall not be subject to the require-
ments of (c)(ii) and (iii) of this subsection. An industrial area is not
required to be principally designed to serve the existing and projected rural
population;
(ii) The intensification of development on lots containing, or new devel-
opment of, small-scale recreational or tourist uses, including commercial
facilities to serve those recreational or tourist uses, that rely on a rural loca-
tion and setting, but that do not include new residential development. A
small-scale recreation or tourist use is not required to be principally
designed to serve the existing and projected rural population. Public serv-
ices and public facilities shall be limited to those necessary to serve the
recreation or tourist use and shall be provided in a manner that does not
permit low-density sprawl;
(iii) The intensification of development on lots containing isolated non-
residential uses or new development of isolated cottage industries and iso-
lated small-scale businesses that are not principally designed to serve the
existing and projected rural population and nonresidential uses, but do
provide job opportunities for rural residents. Public services and public
facilities shall be limited to those necessary to serve the isolated nonresi-
dential use and shall be provided in a manner that does not permit low-
density sprawl.
(iv) A county shall aiopt measures to minimize and contain the existing
areas or uses of more intensive rural development, as appropriate, author-
ized under this subsection. Lands included in such existing areas or uses
shall not extend beyond the logical outer boundary of the existing area or
use, thereby allowing a new pattern of low-density sprawl. Existing areas
are those that are clearly identifiable and contained and where there is a
logical boundary delineated predominately by the built environment, but
that may also include undeveloped lands if limited as provided in this sub-
section. The county shall establish the logical outer boundary of an area of
more intensive rural development. In establishing the logical outer bound-
ary the county shall address (A) the need to preserve the character of
existing natural neighborhoods and communities, (B) physical boundaries
such as bodies of water, streets and highways, and land forms and con-
tours, (C) the prevention of abnormally irregular boundaries, and (D) the
ability to provide public facilities and public services in a manner that does
not permit low-density sprawl;
(v) For purposes of (d) of this subsection, an existing area or existing use is
one that was in existence:
(A) On July 1, 1990, in a county that was initially required to plan
under all of the provisions of this chapter;
(B) On the date the county adopted a resolution under RCW
1999]
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Since the Act's passage, the Growth Boards have clarified the
role of state population projections and allocations related to the
UGAs. Initially, the OFM prescribed population projections ex-
pressed in a range.51 A county may not size UGAs for a population
greater than the high side of this OFM range.12  However, where a
county has elected to plan for the highest point in the OFM range, the
Western Growth Board has strictly scrutinized UGA sizing and
potential development density in rural areas outside of UGAs."3
Other Growth Board decisions have shed some light on how the sizing
of the UGAs may conform to the Act. Generally, the boards continue
to closely scrutinize the sizing of UGAs to avoid urban sprawl.5 4
Counties are required to designate UGAs in which urban growth
is encouraged. 5 Several board decisions have addressed the minimum
density within UGAs. A density of four dwelling units per acre has
been held to comply with "urban growth." Lower densities have been
closely scrutinized, 6 but sometimes upheld. Densities lower than four
dwelling units per acre have been upheld because of prevalent devel-
opment hazards and critical areas. 7
Outside of UGAs, the Boards also have grappled with what is
acceptable density in rural areas to prevent urban sprawl. Densities
36.70A.040(2), in a county that is planning under all of the provisions
of this chapter under RCW 36.70A.040(2); or
(C) On the date the office of financial management certifies the
county's population as provided in RCW 36.70A.040(5), in a county
that is planning under all of the provisions of this chapter pursuant to
RCW 36.70A.040(5).
(e) Exception. This subsection shall not be interpreted to permit in the rural
area a major industrial development or a master planned resort unless otherwise
specifically permitted under RCW 36.70A.360 and 36.70A.365.
51. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.62.035 (1998).
52. See Dawes v. Mason County, Western Washington Growth Management Hearings
Board (WWGMHB) No. 96-2-0023, Final Decision and Order (Dec. 5,1996).
53. See Achen v. Clark County, WWGMHB No. 95-2-0067, Compliance Order and
Order of Invalidity (Oct. 1, 1996). The Washington Court of Appeals recently cast doubt on the
validity of the latter element of the Board's decision. In reviewing a closely related Growth
Board decision, the court held that the Board exceeded its authority in construing the Act to
require the county to plan both rural and urban growth to avoid exceeding OFM population pro-
jections. The court held that the plain meaning of the statute clearly provided that OFM projec-
tions constrain county planning only for urban growth areas, not rural areas. See Clark County
Natural Resources Council v. Clark County, 94 Wash. App. 670, 972 P.2d 941 (1999).
54. See Achen, No. 95-2-0067 WWGMHB (Oct. 1, 1996); Dawes, No. 96-2-0023
WWGMHB (Dec. 5,1996).
55. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110.
56. See LMI/Chevron v. Town of Woodway, Central Puget Sound Growth Management
Hearings Board (CPSGMHB) No. 98-3-0012, Final Decision and Order (Jan. 8, 1999).
57. See Litowitz v. Federal Way, CPSGMHB No. 96-3-0005, Final Decision and Order
(July 22, 1996); Benaroya v. Redmond, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0072c, Final Decision and Order
(March 25, 1996).
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greater than one dwelling unit per five acres have been deemed suspect
even though the statute called for a variety of rural densities." In one
recent case, the Western Board held that a maximum rural density
(minimum lot size) of one dwelling unit per five acres was excessive in
roughly the northern half of Clark County. 9
A major difficulty in making the transition to GMA's antisprawl
regime is existing substandard lots in rural areas. The Western Board
has strongly suggested that the aggregation of contiguous substandard
lots in single ownership should be required, notwithstanding strong
county objections that such a requirement is unfair, may be a consti-
tutional taking or violation of substantive due process, and tends to
reward landowners who evade such requirements by lot swaps and
sales.6" Even where Skagit County apparently required such aggrega-
tion, the Western Board found fault because the requirement allowed
aggregation into lots smaller than one acre.6
2. Concurrency
One of the Act's most significant substantive requirements, the
so-called "concurrency" requirement, was borrowed from Florida.62
Concurrency compels local governments to deny regulatory approval
of proposed development if transportation facilities or strategies neces-
sary to meet the specified level of service (LOS) standard will not be
available concurrently with new development.63 "Concurrent" means
that facility improvements, demand management, or system manage-
ment strategies sufficient to satisfy LOS standards will be in place at
the time of development, or a financial commitment is in place that
will ensure the completion uf improvements within six years.64 The
Act explicitly requires that the transportation concurrency require-
ment be implemented by local adoption and enforcement of "ordi-
nances. '"65 They must prohibit development that would cause
transportation facilities to operate below LOS standards established in
the transportation element of a local GMA plan unless transportation
58. See Woodmansee v. Ferry County, Eastern Washington Growth Management Hear-
ings Board (EWGMHB) No. 95-1-0010, Order on Compliance (April 1997); Dawes,
WWGMHB No. 96-2-0023, (Dec. 5, 1996); Friends of Skagit County v. Skagit County,
WWGMHB No. 95-2-0065, Second Order Re: Modifying or Rescinding Invalidity and Find-
ing of Continued Non-Compliance (Aug. 28, 1996).
59. See Dawes, WWGMHB No. 96-2-0023 (Dec. 5,1996).
60. See id.
61. See Friends of Skagit County, WWGMHB No. 95-2-0065 (Aug. 28, 1996).
62. See Settle & Wolfe, supra note 16, at 5.
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facility improvements or strategies to accommodate the increased
demand are in place concurrent with the development.66
The transportation concurrency requirement leaves central issues
unresolved. Are there state-mandated limits on LOS standards a local
government may adopt? May a city choose congestion as a strategy to
induce motorists to use public transportation? What constitutes an
adequate financial commitment? And "within six years" of what?
Regulatory approval? Completion of construction?
A major issue not resolved by the Act is whether the concurrency
requirement applies to other public facilities. The relevant GMA goal
calls for assurance of adequate public facilities to serve new develop-
ment without reduction of service standards. The goal includes
"public facilities and services" generally and does not single out trans-
portation facilities.67 However, the Act goes on to explicitly require
concurrency only for transportation facilities.6" Whether the GMA
goal effectively establishes a general public facilities and services con-
currency standard was not resolved by the legislature.
The requirement that counties and cities accommodate OFM's
projected population increase, in combination with the concurrency
limitation, presents a critical dilemma not explicitly resolved by the
Act. What if, even with maximum permissible impact fees,69 funding
deficiencies preclude public facility improvements sufficient to meet
concurrency standards for the new development that are necessary to
accommodate projected population growth? Which requirement pre-
vails? Must level of service standards be lowered or the concurrency
requirement be suspended? Or is local government relieved of the
obligation to accommodate projected population growth? Or does the
GMA implicitly impose upon local governments an affirmative obli-
gation to provide adequate public facilities to support projected
growth? The Act leaves all of these questions unanswered.
The Growth Boards have addressed a few of the questions left
unanswered by the legislature. The Western Board has held that the
concurrency requirement extends beyond transportation facilities to
public facilities and services necessary to support development.7 °
66. See id.
67. See id. § 36.70A.020(12).
68. See id. § 36.70A.070(6)(e).
69. Impact fees, previously subject to severe limitations, were expressly authorized for
GMA counties and cities subject to definitive procedural and substantive requirements. These
provisions, although adopted as part of GMA I, were not codified in RCW chapter 36.70A, but
at RCW §§ 82.02.050-090 (1998). See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1, at 923-25.
70. See Taxpayers for Responsible Government v. City of Oak Harbor, WWGMHB No.
96-2-0002, Final Decision and Order (July 16, 1996).
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While the Board's ruling seems to grant broad substantive discretion
to a city, it imposes burdensome procedural requirements.
The substantive effect of concurrency requirements ultimately
depends on locally set level of service standards. In cases challenging
such standards for transportation facilities, the Growth Boards have
granted local governments virtually limitless discretion. Use of a
"failing road" standard was within local discretion." Similarly, a
virtual "gridlock" level of service for Seattle streets was upheld.
According to the Central Board, the Act requires only a gauge of
performance-it does not dictate what is "too congested. "72
3. Essential Public Facilities and Affordable Housing
The GMA directs local governments to be regionally responsible
by accommodating essential public facilities and affordable housing.
The Act requires that GMA plans include a process for identifying
and siting "essential public facilities" (EPFs) that are "typically diffi-
cult to site, such as airports, state education facilities, state and local
correctional facilities, solid waste handling facilities, and inpatient
facilities including substance abuse facilities, mental health facilities,
and group homes. ' 73 Substantively, local comprehensive plans may
not preclude the siting of EPFs 4
Similarly, local GMA plans must include a housing element
containing policies for the preservation, improvement, and develop-
ment of housing sufficient to satisfy the local fair share of regional
housing needs.7" Substantively, the policies must make adequate pro-
vision for the housing needs of all economic segments of the commu-
nity and designate sufficient land for housing, including government-
assisted, low-income, manufactured, and multifamily housing, and
group homes and foster care facilities.
While the Act implies that each county and city must bear a fair
share of regional housing needs, the statute fails to define the require-
ment and how it is to be met. 6 Similarly, the Act fails to define the
requirement of state and local cooperation in siting such indispensable
but locally unpopular facilities as airports, prisons, and garbage
71. See Achen v. Clark County, WWGMHB No. 95-2-0067, Final Decision and Order
(Sept. 20, 1995).
72. See West Seattle Defense Fund v. City of Seattle, No. 94-3-0016 CPSGMHB, Final
Decision and Order (April 4, 1995).
73. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.200; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-340 (1999).
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.200(2).
75. See id. § 36.70A.070(2); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-310 (1999).
76. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.020(4), .070(2).
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dumps,77 beyond prohibiting local plans from precluding such facili-
ties. The county-wide planning policy process must be employed to
coordinate local plan policies on the distribution of affordable housing
and siting of essential facilities.7 However, given the vague statutory
language, local governments can only guess at the nature and extent of
the substantive requirements.
In the first case addressing the local obligation to accommodate
housing needs and essential public facilities, the Central Board synthe-
sized, from five sections of the Act, "a legislatively preferred residen-
tial landscape that, compared with the past, will be less homogeneous,
more diverse, more compact and better furnished with facilities and
services to support the needs of the changing residential population."79
The Board, on several independent grounds, held that a Bellevue
ordinance regulating the location of group homes for children,
including children with handicaps, violated GMA housing and EPF
provisions.80
In Litowitz v. City of Federal Way,"' the petitioners unsuccess-
fully argued that the city failed to comply with the GMA requirement
that the city accommodate the housing needs of all economic segments
of the population;8 2 failed to identify sufficient land for governmental
assisted housing, multifamily housing, and group homes; 3 and failed
to make adequate provision for existing and projected needs of all
economic segments of the community. 84 The Board stressed that the
requirement pertained to the city as a whole and did not obligate the
city to allow high density residential use of any specific parcel of land.
The Boards also have defined railroad and airport facilities as
essential public facilities. The Central Board held that the City of
Auburn's comprehensive plan designation of railroad land for light
industry, where all significant activities must take place indoors, pre-
cluded the siting of additional railroad facilities, which the Board
deemed to be EPFs. 5 The Board broadly defined "essential public
facilities":
77. See id. § 36.70A.200. Such facilities sometimes are referred to as LULUs (locally unde-
sirable land uses) or NIMBYs (not in my back yard) uses.
78. See id. § 36.70A.210(c), (e).
79. The Children's Alliance and Low Income Housing Institute v. City of Bellevue,
CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0011, Final Decision and Order (July 25, 1995) (construing WASH. REV.
CODE § 36.70A.020(4), .070(2), .200, .400, and .410).
80. See id.
81. CPSGMHB No. 96-3-0005, Final Decision and Order (July 22, 1996).
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.020(4).
83. See id. §§ 36.70.020(4), .070(2).
84. See id. § 36.70.070(2).
85. See Hapsmith v. City of Auburn, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0075c, Final Decision and
[Vol. 23:5
GMA in the Courts
Significantly, essential public facilities may be large or small,
many or few, and may be either capital projects (e.g., airports
and prisons) or uses of land and existing structures (e.g., mental
health facilities and group homes). The characteristic they share
is that they are essential to the common good, but their local
siting traditionally has been thwarted by exclusionary land use
policies, regulations, or practices. For this reason, RCW
36.70A.200 has, in effect, preempted such behavior.86
In Port of Seattle v. City of Des Moines, 7 the Central Board
addressed whether an airport is an EPF and whether city plan policies
violated the Act by precluding an EPF. The Port of Seattle proposed
a new runway and other improvements at the airport. The expansion
required a large volume of fill dirt. The borrow site for the fill was
within Des Moines, and trucks hauling this fill dirt would travel
through the city. The city's plan obligated the city to oppose the
necessary excavation and hauling operations. Because the policy pre-
cluded the necessary support activities for expansion of an EPF, the
Board held that the city did not comply with the GMA.88 The Board
interpreted "essential public facilities" as including new airports as
well as the expansion of airports existing at the date of GMA's adop-
tion.89
4. Natural Resource Lands and Environmentally Critical Areas
The first required step in local implementation of the GMA is
the designation and adoption of interim development regulations to
protect natural resource lands (agriculture, timber, and mineral lands)
and critical areas (wetlands, potable water aquifer recharge areas, fish
and wildlife habitat, frequently flooded areas, and geologically hazard-
ous areas).9 While the two categories of special lands are lumped
together in the statutory provisions requiring their designation and
protection, close attention to the Act's goals and definitions reveals
two quite different legislative purposes.9' Natural resource lands are
protected not for the sake of their ecological role, but to assure the
viability of the resource-based industries that depend on them.92
Order (May 10, 1996).
86. Id., quoting Children's Alliance, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0011 (July 25, 1995).
87. CPSGMHB No. 97-3-0014, Final Decision and Order (Aug. 13, 1997).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.030, .060, .170.
91. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.030(2), (8), and (11).
92. See id. § 36.70A.020(8) ("Natural resource industries. Maintain and enhance natural
resource-based industries, including protective timber, agricultural, and fisheries industries.
Encourage the conservation of productive forest lands and productive agricultural lands, and dis-
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Allowing conversion of resource lands to other uses, or allowing
incompatible uses nearby, impairs the viability and productivity of
resource industries. Critical areas are protected because their devel-
opment would be ecologically detrimental or hazardous to life or
property.
The designation and interim protective regulation of both cate-
gories of land is required as the first step in growth management
implementation. This precludes urban growth area status for areas
unsuited to such development and, in the case of critical areas, pre-
vents irreversible environmental harm during the lengthy process of
preparing GMA comprehensive plans and development regulations.
The interim designations and regulations, required as the first
step in the GMA process, expire on the adoption of final development
regulations. When formulating comprehensive plans and imple-
menting development regulations, the interim designations and regu-
lations must be reviewed and amended, if appropriate, to achieve
consistency with the plan.93 The natural resource regulations must
"assure the conservation" of designated agricultural, forest, and min-
eral resource lands, and must "assure that the use of lands adjacent to
[resource lands] shall not interfere with their continued use, in the
accustomed manner and in accordance with best management prac-
tices."94  The critical area regulations must "protect" designated
critical areas.9"
The statutory definitions96 provide general standards for desig-
nation of such lands, but the Act is terse on the requisite level of pres-
ervation of natural resource lands, and nearly mute on substantive
standards for local protection of critical areas. As a result, the Boards
have heard numerous challenges of the legal sufficiency of natural
resource lands and critical area regulations.
The Boards accord relatively little deference to cities and coun-
ties in designating and protecting critical areas because the statutory
mandates are explicit and quite definitive. All critical areas must be
designated, yet there is some local discretion to establish differential
levels of protection. The state designation guidelines97 generally are
characterized by the Boards as advisory (i.e., they must be "consid-
ered") rather than mandatory. But some decisions, without discus-
sion, give the guidelines seemingly conclusive effect.
courage incompatible uses.").
93. See id. § 36.70A.060(3).
94. Id. § 36.70A.060(1).
95. See id. § 36.70A.060(2).
96. See id. §§ 36.70A.030(2), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11), (17).
97. See id. § 36.70A.050(1); WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 365-190 (1999).
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The Boards have disagreed about the meaning and effect of the
"best available science" requirement. A 1996 GMA amendment
requires counties and cities to "include" best available science in des-
ignating and protecting critical areas and to give special consideration
to preservation of anadromous fisheries.9" But the Boards are divided
on whether the best science requirement is procedural99 or substan-
tive.°°
Other Board decisions relating to critical areas have more clearly
filled GMA's gaps. Shoreline Master Programs now are GMA devel-
opment regulations that must protect critical wetland areas."'
Department of Ecology (WDOE) decisions approving or denying
amendments of local Shoreline Master Programs of cities or counties
planning under GMA are now appealable to the Growth Boards rather
than the Shoreline Hearings Board (SHB).0 2
One Board decision addressed groundwater protection. Under
two separate GMA provisions, potable water aquifer recharge areas
must be protected by critical area regulations, and groundwater used
as a public water supply must be protected in the land use element of
GMA plans. 3 The Board recognized these overlapping requirements
and observed that critical area regulations would prevail in case of
conflict with the land use element of plans. 4
In determining the validity of provisions for natural resource
land, the Boards have been demanding of local government, often
finding deficiencies in designation and protection of agricultural, for-
est, or mineral resource lands. The Western Board has broadly
applied the twin tests of "long term commercial significance" and "not
characterized by urban growth" on an area-wide basis, while the
Central Board has more narrowly allowed potential resource land to be
98. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.172.
99. See, e.g., HEAL v. City of Seattle, CPSGMHB No. 96-3-0012, Final Decision and
Order (Aug. 21, 1996).
100. See, e.g., Easy v. Spokane County, EWGMHB No. 96-1-0016, Final Decision and
Order (April 10, 1997); Clark County Natural Resources Council v. Clark County, WWGMHB
No. 96-2-0017, Final Decision and Order (Dec. 6, 1996). See also Tulalip Tribes v. Snohomish
County, WWGMHB No. 96-3-0029, Final Decision and Order (Jan. 8,1997).
101. See Seaview Coast Conservation Coalition v. Pacific County, WWGMHB No. 95-2-
0076, Second Compliance Order and Finding of Invalidity (Feb. 6, 1997).
102. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(1)(a). See also Gilpin v. Washington State
Dep't of Ecology, CPSGMHB No. 97-3-0003, Final Decision and Order (June 30, 1997); San
Juan County v. Washington State Dep't of Ecology, WWGMHB No. 97-2-0002, Final Deci-
sion and Order (June 19, 1997).
103. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.060, .070(1).
104. Agriculture for Tomorrow v. City of Arlington, WWGMHB No. 95-3-0056, Final
Decision and Order (Feb. 13, 1996).
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evaluated on a parcel-by-parcel basis."0 5 In most of the recent cases
where designation and protection of natural resource land by counties
has been challenged, the counties have been held not in compliance
with relevant GMA requirements, and invalidity orders have been
frequent.
B. Procedural Requirements
While GMA's substantive requirements "grab the headlines,"
the Act's voluminous requirements are mainly procedural. 10 6 Even the
substantive mandates are contained within required processes. Thus,
procedurally, the Act requires local designation of interim and final
urban growth areas that meet several significant substantive stan-
dards.0 7 Procedurally, the Act requires local adoption of concurrency
standards that meet minimal substantive standards.' Procedurally,
the Act requires local planning for housing'0 9 that meets vague sub-
stantive standards.' Procedurally, the Act requires local adoption of
a system for identifying and siting essential public facilities"' that
must be implemented to avoid the substantive preclusion of such uses
and structures.12 Procedurally, the Act requires the interim and final
designation and regulatory protection of critical areas and natural
resource lands" 3 that meet various specific and general substantive
standards."4
Whether the Act's three consistency requirements are regarded
as procedural or substantive is a semantic question. The plans of
adjacent counties and cities must be consistent."' Local development
regulations, capital budget decisions, and other activities must be con-
sistent ("in conformity") with local plans." 6  Also, plans must be
internally consistent.' 7 In each instance, while substantive consist-
105. Compare Achen v. Clark County, WWGMHB No. 95-2-0067, Final Decision and
Order (Sept. 20, 1995) and Benaroya v. City of Redmond, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0072, Final
Decision and Order (March 25, 1996). However, the Supreme Court of Washington, in dicta,
said that the Board erred in so construing GMA designation criteria. City of Redmond v. Cen-
tral Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998).
106. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1, at 904-20.
107. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110.
108. Id. §§ 36.70A.020(12), 070(6).
109. Id. § 36.70A.070(2).
110. See id. §§ 36.70A.020(4), .070(2), .400, .410.
111. Id. § 36.70A.200(1).
112. Id. §§ 36.70A.030, .040, .060, .170.
113. Id. §§ 36.70A.200(2), .410, .450.
114. See, e.g., id. §§ 36.70A.030, .060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 365-190 (1999).
115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.100.
116. See id. §§ 36.70A.040(3) and (4), .120.
117. See id. §36.70A.070.
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ency is required, substantive content generally is not imposed by the
state.
The Act's central procedural requirements will be briefly
described in roughly chronological order in the following sections.
The numerous Growth Board decisions adjudicating even more
numerous issues of local compliance with GMA's many and often
detailed procedural requirements are beyond the scope of this Article,
with the exception of those that have been judicially reviewed.
1. Adoption of Countywide Planning Policies
The countywide planning policy (CPP)".8 is the vehicle to imple-
ment the requirement that the plans of adjacent counties and cities be
coordinated and consistent.1 19 Counties, characterized as "regional
governments," have ultimate authority to adopt CPPs, but only after
completing extensive cooperative processes to assure that cities, char-
acterized as "primary providers of urban governmental services," are
fully heard. 2 ' Analogous multicounty planning polices must be
adopted by counties with populations exceeding 400,000 and contigu-
ous urban areas-presently only King, Pierce, and Snohomish coun-
ties. 2  Other counties may do so. 2
2. Designation and Protective Regulations of Critical Areas
and Natural Resource Lands
Both the designation and regulation of critical areas and natural
resource lands were to be done in two stages. Preliminary or interim
designation and regulation were subject to GMA's earliest deadline,
September 1, 1991.123 Later, designation and regulation were to be
finalized, after plan adoption, as development regulations. 24 In prac-
tice, local compliance with the critical area and natural resource lands
requirements sometimes straddled the CPP process, which was not
adopted until 1991 as part of GMA II.
3. Designation of Urban Growth Areas
UGA designation, as ultimately required by a GMA amend-
ment, has also become a two-step process." 5 As in the case of critical
118. See id. §36.70A.210.
119. See id. § 36.70A.100.
120. See Postema v. Snohomish County, 83 Wash. App. 574, 922 P.2d 176 (1996).
121. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.210(7).
122. See id.
123. See id. §§ 36.70A.060, .120.
124. See id. § 36.70A.060(3).
125. See id. § 36.70A.110(5).
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areas and natural resource lands, interim UGA designation is designed
to avoid inappropriate use and development of land inside and outside
UGAs during lengthy planning processes. 126 UGA designations must
be finalized at the time of comprehensive plan adoption and included
in the plan.127  While counties have ultimate authority to designate
UGAs, they are constrained by extensive process requirements
designed to assure that cities are heard. 25
4. Adoption of Comprehensive Plans
The most pervasive and burdensome requirement that the Act
imposes on GMA counties and cities is to develop and adopt compre-
hensive plans 29 addressing numerous specified subjects 3 ° and satis-
fying statutory procedural and substantive standards.' The compre-
hensive plan is the central nervous system of the GMA. It receives
and processes all relevant information and sends policy signals to
shape public and private behavior. The GMA has infused compre-
hensive plans with potency previously unknown in Washington. The
plan must contain data and detailed policies to guide the expansion
and extension of public facilities and the use and development of land,
as prescribed by the Act'3 2 and extensively explained by the CTED
Procedural Criteria.
133
Most significantly, the Act requires that plan policies coordinate
the provision of public facilities, especially transportation facilities,
with private land development. 3 4 A GMA plan may not be a mere
community wish list; it must be an internally consistent document.1
3S
A GMA plan may not be autonomous; it must be coordinated and
consistent with the GMA plans of counties and cities sharing borders
or regional problems.'36 A GMA plan may not be ignored; it must be
implemented by enactment of development regulations consistent
with its policies.' 37 Also, counties and cities must "perform their acti-
126. See discussion of Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 974 P.2d 863
(Wash. App. Ct. 1999), infra Part 111.K.
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110(5), (6). But see Association of Rural Residents, 974
P.2d 863 (holding that interim UGA designations constituted development regulations, dis-
cussed at infra Part I1.K).
128. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110(1).
129. See id. § 36.70A.040.
130. See id. § 36.70A.070.
131. See id. §§ 36.70A.070, .100, .110, .130, .140, .180, .210.
132. See id. §§ 36.70A.070, .200.
133. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-300 to 330 (1999).
134. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(3), (4), (6).
135. See id. § 36.70A.070.
136. See id. §§ 36.70A.100, .210.
137. See id. § 36.70A.120.
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vities and make capital budget decisions in conformity with" their
comprehensive plans.' The discipline of GMA plans may not be
avoided by opportunistic amendments. Generally, proposed amend-
ments must be considered and decided collectively only once a year
and may not "breach the plan's internal consistency."' 39 Even state
agencies must comply with local GMA plans and implementing regu-
lations. 4°
All GMA plans must address land use, housing, capital facilities,
utilities, and transportation.' 4' County plans also must contain a rural
element.'42 Because all cities must be within UGAs under the Act and
are supposed to be entirely urban, eventually,143 a rural element would
be irrelevant in a city plan.
The land use element must contain policies and maps determi-
ing the location and distribution of the various land uses, including
agriculture, timber production, housing, commerce, industry, recrea-
tion, open spaces, and public utilities and facilities. 14  This element
also must address appropriate population densities and building inten-
sities in relation to the various uses, as well as to future population
growth; the protection of groundwater quality and quantity; and the
management of drainage, flooding, and storm-water runoff. 45
While the land use element is a purely procedural requirement,
the housing element provisions contain substantive limits as well. 46
The process required for the housing element is the assembly of data
on existing and projected housing needs and the adoption of policies
for the preservation, improvement, and development of housing. 47
The Act's procedural requirements for the utilities element are
modest. The plan must merely specify the location and capacity of all
existing and proposed utilities, including but not limited to, electrical,
telecommunication, and natural gas lines. 4 '
The transportation element is subject to the most rigorous pro-
cedural and substantive requirements of all.'49 Procedurally, the rela-
138. Id.
139. Id. § 36.70A.130.
140. See id. §36.70A.103.
141. See id. § 36.70A.070.
142. Id. § 36.70A.070(5).
143. See id. § 36.70A.110.
144. Id. § 36.70A.070(1).
145. See id. § 36.70A.070(1); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-305 (1999).
146. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(2); WASH ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-310
(1999).
147. See id.
148. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(4); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-320
(1999).
149. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(6); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-325
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tionship between land use assumptions and transportation needs must
be articulated; existing air, water, and land transportation facilities and
services must be inventoried; regionally coordinated service standards
for road and transit facilities must be adopted; means of rectifying
facility deficiencies must be specified; future increases in demand for
facilities must be forecast; facility expansion necessary to meet pre-
dicted demand must be identified; a multiyear financing plan must be
prepared; and demand management strategies must be formulated."' 0
In addition, if funding is inadequate for needed facility expansion
based on land use assumptions, adequate funding sources must be
identified, or the land use element must be revised to bring needed
facility expansion in line with available funding."'
The capital facilities element also has both procedural and sub-
stantive dimensions. 5 2 Procedurally, plans must contain an inventory
of existing capital facilities owned by public entities, a forecast of
future needs, proposed locations and capacities of new or expanded
facilities, and a plan for financing such public facility development
covering a period of at least six years. 3 Substantively, the cost of
planned capital facilities must be within projected available funding. 4
To ensure that the land use element, capital facilities element, and
financing plan are consistent, there is a requirement that the land use
element be reassessed and revised if expected funding is inadequate for
a proposed capital facility expansion.155
The rural element required in county comprehensive plans is a
land use element for areas not designated for urban growth, agricul-
ture, timber production, or mineral extraction.'56 Substantively, the
rural element generally must not allow urban growth, must "provide
for a variety of rural densities and uses," and assure visual compati-
bility of rural development with the surrounding rural area. 7
Comprehensive plans may include any other elements and con-
sistent subarea components.' Plans must be developed in substantial
(1999).
150. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(6)(a)-(e).
151. See id. § 36.70A.070(6)(c)(iii).
152. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(3); WASH ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-315
(1999). The term "capital facilities" is not defined in the statute or procedural criteria. Perhaps
the definition of "public facilities" is expected to do double duty.
153. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(3).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(5); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-330
(1999).
157. Id.
158. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 36.70A.080(1), (2).
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compliance with statutory public participation requirements" 9 and be
adopted by variable deadlines, the earliest of which was July 1,
1994.160
5. Adoption of Development Regulations
The last major step in local GMA compliance is the enactment
of development regulations that are consistent with and implement the
comprehensive plan.' 6' The regulations must be developed in sub-
stantial compliance with the statutory public participation require-
ments. 6
2
The term "development regulations" encompasses any official
control of land use and development, including explicitly authorized
"innovative techniques" such as density bonuses, cluster housing,
planned unit developments, and transferable development rights. 63
Development regulations include the required natural resource land,
critical area,164 and shoreline regulations. 65
III. GMA IN THE COURTS
In the late 1960s, powerful social forces demanded that govern-
ment be environmentally conscientious and socially responsible. In
Washington, the courts were sympathetic, proactively extending com-
mon law doctrines in keeping with rapidly changing social conscious-
ness and values before the legislature had responded. For example,
the Supreme Court of Washington, in two decisions, virtually stopped
all development in and over both navigable166 and nonnavigable 167
waters under common law public trust and riparian rights doctrines,
159. Seeid. §36.70A.140.
160. As a result of a 1993 amendment, deadlines for comprehensive plan adoption are:
July 1, 1994, for initially-bound counties with 50,000 or more people and their cities; January 1,
1995, for initially-bound counties with fewer than 50,000 people and their cities; and four years
from the date a county subsequently came under the GMA regime by choice or population
change for such counties and their cities. The 1993 amendment does not affect CTED's author-
ity, under RCW 36.70A.045, to extend the comprehensive plan deadline by up to 180 days.
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040, as amended by 1993 Wash. Laws 1st Sp. Sess. 1804, ch. 6, §
1.
161. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.120.
162. See id. § 36.70A.140.
163. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.030(7), .090.
164. See id. § 36.70A.060(3).
165. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1999); Seaview Coast Conservation Coalition v.
Pacific County, WWGMHB No. 95-2-0076, Second Compliance Order and Finding of Invalid-
ity (Feb. 6, 1997).
166. See Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969). See also SETTLE,
WASHINGTON LAND USE, supra note 2, at § 4.2.
167. See Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
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respectively. In doing so, the court galvanized affected interest
groups, which induced the legislature and electorate to adopt
comprehensive shoreline management legislation. 68
Similarly, in two decisions, the court infused old doctrines with
new meaning to invalidate, on both procedural and substantive
grounds, local approvals of a mammoth aluminum production plant 69
and an oil refinery17° at environmentally sensitive sites on the shores of
Puget Sound. In these cases, a potent "appearance of fairness" doc-
trine was derived from common law due process, and the traditionally
deferential "spot zoning" doctrine was retooled to closely scrutinize
the wisdom of local land use policy choices. In another case presaging
a central element of the state's growth management legislation by a
decade, the court required that local land use actions rationally serve
not merely local public interests, but the general welfare of the entire
affected region. 7'
In addition to anticipating and even inducing environmental and
land use legislation, Washington courts have broadly construed novel
statutes, sometimes imbuing them with potent effects that even their
sponsors had not contemplated. The courts not only expansively con-
strued the requirements of the Shoreline Management Act (SMA), 72
but employed the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) to extend
SMA's reach.'73 SEPA's terse, predominantly procedural provisions
were broadly construed'74 to impose controversial constraints that
were not generally foreseen as SEPA barely caused a ripple in navi-
gating the legislative process. 7 ' Moreover, the courts infused SEPA
with a potential substantive bite that allows state and local agencies to
deny proposals even when they satisfy definitive land use regula-
tions."'
In the 1980s, popular support for environmental protection and
quality of life remained strong, but was complicated by taxpayer
revolt. Prevailing public opinion demanded that government provide
ever higher levels of environmental quality and community amenity
168. See generally SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE, supra note 2, at § 4.2.
169. See Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
170. See Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
171. See SAVE v. Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
172. See, e.g., Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wash. 2d 280, 552 P.2d 1038 (1978).
173. See Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wash. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973).
174. See, e.g., Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166
(1973). See generally SETTLE, SEPA, supra note 3, at § 6.
175. See SETTLE, SEPA, supra note 3, at § 2.
176. See, e.g., Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978),
West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 40 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266 (1987). See generally
SETTLE, SEPA, supra note 3, at § 18.
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without raising taxes. In response, public officials increasingly
imposed the cost of enhancing the quality of life on narrow segments
of society through severe restrictions on the use of private property
and through regulatory exactions of public goods. This new political
reality-that the benefits of environmental protection are widely
shared while the burdens often are narrowly borne-has tempered
judicial support for novel land use and environmental regulation
during the past decade. The courts continue to support innovative
and burdensome regulatory requirements that disappoint traditional
expectations as long as the burdens are reasonably necessary and fairly
allocated.'77 However, where heavy regulatory burdens seem to be
unreasonably burdensome or opportunistically assigned to a few for
the benefit of many, they have not survived judicial scrutiny.
78
The GMA, in pursuit of noble goals, requires local governments
to plan for public facilities and regulate the use of private property in
ways that often radically disappoint traditional expectations and make
some property owners richer and others poorer. As in the past,
Washington courts generally have embraced and deferred to the
environmentally conscientious and socially responsible policies chosen
by the legislature in the GMAY19 However, in contrast to the SMA
and SEPA, the courts, perhaps mindful of GMA's extremely discor-
dant legislative history, have not been inclined to expansively construe
the Act's requirements. 8 ' Moreover, as the GMA is implemented by
local governments, subject to Growth Board review, and real effects
are felt, Washington courts can be expected to maintain their tradi-
tional vigilance for substantive and procedural fairness.
A. Judicial Attitude Toward the GMA, In General
The courts generally have embraced the purposes, goals, and
central principles of the Act. Apparent judicial concern that unin-
formed, disgruntled citizens might undermine the legislature's state-
wide growth management goals has led the courts to deny the availa-
bility of referenda and initiatives to override GMA implementation
decisions of local governing bodies.'' Facial constitutional challenges
177. See, e.g., Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993);
Jones v. King County, 74 Wash. App. 467, 874 P.2d 853 (1994).
178. See, e.g., Guirnont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993); Sintra, Inc. v.
City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
179. See, e.g., Anderson 1, 123 Wash. 2d 151, 868 P.2d 116 (1994).
180. See, e.g., Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135
Wash. 2d 542, 958 P.2d 962 (1998).
181. See generally Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wash. 2d 345, 884 P.2d 1326 (1994);
Anderson 1, 123 Wash. 2d 151, 868 P.2d 116 (1994); Save Our State Parks v. Board of Clallam
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of core GMA requirements have been quite summarily rejected.'82 It
remains to be seen whether specific "as applied" challenges may fare
better. In dicta, the courts routinely recite the legislative findings
supporting GMA's central purposes to concentrate growth in UGAs
while protecting environmentally critical areas, natural resource
industries, and efficient public facilities and services from the
consequences of sprawl."S3
Even in cases where no GMA issue was before the court, the
state's growth management principles have been invoked. In Erickson
& Associates v. McLerran,8 4 the court refused to expand the vested
rights doctrine because of, inter alia, GMA's legislative findings that
intensified land use regulation is necessary to protect the quality of
Washington's communities and environment. In King County v.
Washington State Boundary Review Board for King County,18 5 the court
held that an environmental impact statement was required for a pro-
posed annexation because GMA's UGA provisions made urban
development of the annexed area virtually inevitable.
While generally supportive of the legislature's growth manage-
ment purposes, the courts have not been inclined to broadly construe
the Act's constraints on local government unless clear and specific
legislative intent has supported expansive interpretation. Thus, in
Vashon Island Committee for Self-Government v. Washington State
Boundary Review Board for King County,'86 the court broadly con-
strued then-applicable statutes to preclude incorporation outside of
urban growth areas to effectuate the clear and specific legislative intent
to allow urban development only in designated UGAs. However, in
Clark County National Resources Council v. Clark County Citizens
United,87 the court refused to depart from plain statutory meaning in
holding that the county was required to base only its potential devel-
opment within UGAs, not potential development outside UGAs, on
OFM population projections. Nor have the courts been willing to
County Comm'rs, 74 Wash. App. 637, 875 P.2d 673 (1994).
182. See Anderson II, 124 Wash. 2d 834, 881 P.2d 240 (1994); Postema v. Snohomish
County, 83 Wash. App. 574, 922 P.2d 176 (1996); Jones, 74 Wash. App. 467, 874 P.2d 853
(1994).
183. See, e.g., City of Redmond v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings
Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998); Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Skagit
County, 135 Wash. 2d 542, 958 P.2d 962 (1998); Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wash. 2d
345, 884 P.2d 1326 (1994); Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 974 P.2d 863
(Wash. Ct. App., 1999); Clark County Natural Resources Council v. Clark County Citizens
United, 94 Wash. App. 670, 972, P.2d 941 (1999).
184. 123 Wash. 2d 864, 876, 872 P.2d 1090, 1097 (1994).
185. 122 Wash. 2d 648, 665, 860 P.2d 1024, 1033-34 (1993).
186. 127 Wash. 2d 759, 771-72, 903 P.2d 953, 959 (1995).
187. 94 Wash. App. 670, 974 P.2d 670 (1999).
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endorse expansive interpretations of the Growth Boards unless they
are firmly rooted in statutory language and legislative intent.
In Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit
County,188 the first state supreme court case reviewing a Growth Board
decision, the court held that the Board had exceeded its authority by
invalidating development regulations adopted prior to the GMA. The
court recalled its general reluctance to find that an agency had implied
authority, especially where the agency was created by a statute, like
GMA, with no provision for liberal construction. 89 The justiciable
issue, the court stressed, was whether the asserted Growth Board
authority was supported by statutory language or clear legislative
intent, not whether such authority would be wise public policy that
would foster the broad purposes of the Act:
Whether it would be beneficial, useful or reasonable for a
growth management hearings board to have the power to invali-
date pre-Act ordinances is not at issue, only the statutory
authorization of that power .... Even if we agreed with 1000
Friends that public policy would be better served if the board
were granted stronger remedial powers, we are not in a position
to create those powers. Our role is to interpret the statute as
enacted by the Legislature, after the Legislature's determination
of what remedy best serves the public interests of this state; we
will not rewrite the statute.190
Similarly, in HEAL v. City of Seattle,'9' the most recent GMA
case, the Washington Court of Appeals, in reviewing an issue of the
Board's authority, stressed that "the Legislature grants agencies
authority, and takes a dim "iew of agencies granting themselves addi-
tional authority. This was a recurring theme in recent regulatory
reform efforts in the Legislature."' 92 Even though the court held that
the Board had too narrowly limited its authority in deciding that it had
jurisdiction to review critical area regulations, but not critical area
policies, the court commended the Central Puget Sound Board's
"reluctance to assert jurisdiction beyond that expressly granted."' 93
The court declined to award fees to the winning party because the
Board's decision was "substantially justified. "i94
188. 135 Wash. 2d 542, 565-68, 958 P.2d 962, 973-74 (1998).
189. See Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 565, 958 P.2d at 973.
190. Id. at 567, 958 P.2d at 974.
191. 979 P.2d 864 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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The Skagit Surveyors and HEAL cases exemplify significantly
different inclinations on issues of Board authority by the Western
Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (WWGMHB)
and the Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board
(CPSGMHB). The WWGMHB has tended to construe its authority
more expansively and has been reined in by the courts. The
CPSGMHB has interpreted its authority more restrictively. Indeed,
in HEAL, the court sympathetically held that the CPSGMHB had too
narrowly limited its own authority."'
The courts seem to recognize that, unlike SEPA and SMA,
GMA was spawned by controversy, not consensus. The relative
spheres of state mandate and local autonomy were the product of
extremely difficult legislative compromise. It is no accident that the
GMA contains no provision for liberal construction. Thus, broad
interpretation of GMA requirements and deference to Growth Board
decisions have not necessarily occurred. The courts have analyzed
each issue in light of statutory language and legislative history to
determine whether the legislature intended to impose an asserted
requirement on local government, and, in cases of broad or ambiguous
GMA requirements, whether the legislature intended local govern-
ments or the Growth Boards to "fill in the blanks."
B. Obtaining Judicial Review of GMA Issues
There are several potential routes to judicial review of GMA
claims. Choosing the wrong route for a given GMA issue may be
fatal. Under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
claims that legislative action or inaction violates GMA requirements
generally must be pursued before the Growth Boards as a prerequisite
to judicial review196 unless all parties to a petition before a Board agree
to direct review in superior court. 197  Growth Board decisions are
reviewable in superior court by express provision of the GMA.198
195. See id.
196. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.534 (1998). See also Simpson Tacoma Kraft Co. v.
Department of Ecology, 119 Wash. 2d 640, 646, 835 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1992); cf Citizens for
Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 865-68, 947 P.2d 1208, 1211-12
(1997) (holding that exhaustion principle did not require appeal to Board of issues beyond its
jurisdiction); King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 91
Wash. App. 1, 25-26, 951 P.2d 1151, 1164 (1998), affd in part, rev'd in part, 979 P.2d 374
(Wash. 1999) (holding that failure to appeal issue to Board precluded its adjudication in a LUPA
action).
197. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.295.
198. See id. § 36.70A.300(5). In Project for Informed Citizens v. Columbia County, 92
Wash. App. 290, 293-94, 966 P.2d 338, 340-41 (1998), the court rejected the implausible argu-
ment that "a final decision" subject to judicial review under RCW 36.70A.300(5) referred only
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Such review is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),'99 except as modified by the GMA. °° This statutory means of
obtaining judicial review is exclusive for parties aggrieved by Growth
Board decisions.
Thus, in Torrance v. King County,2"' an unsuccessful petitioner to
the Growth Board who had elected not to seek statutory review of the
Board decision was denied the right to obtain extraordinary judicial
review through constitutional writ of certiorari because an adequate
remedy at law was available by statute.0 2 Similarly, in King County v.
Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board,.3 the court
held that judicial review of UGA designation, a GMA issue within the
Board's jurisdiction, could not be obtained pursuant to the Land Use
Petition Act (LUPA)2°4 because LUPA explicitly precluded its avail-
ability to review "[1]and use decisions of local jurisdiction that are
subject to review by a quasi-judicial body created by state law, such
as. . . the growth management hearings board."2 '
When parties agree to bypass the Growth Board and proceed
directly to superior court, the Growth Board must concur. With a few
exceptions, in cases of "direct judicial review," the court is subject to
the same jurisdictional limitations as the Growth Board.0 6 In such
cases, the court is authorized to "use its remedial and contempt
powers to enforce compliance" with GMA requirements." 7 Under the
APA, the parties may elect to bypass the superior court and obtain
direct review in the court of appeals or, at its discretion, the supreme
court. 2" The first case in which the supreme court reviewed a Growth
Board decision followed this route.U9
Cases raising GMA issues that were outside the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Growth Boards have reached the courts through
to the Board's first order in a petition but not a subsequent compliance or noncompliance order
after remand. The court astutely projected the perverse consequences that the asserted interpre-
tation would cause.
199. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300(5).
200. See Project for Informed Citizens v. Columbia County, 92 Wash. App. 290, 294-97,
966 P.2d 338, 340-42 (1998).
201. 136 Wash. 2d 783, 966 P.2d 891 (1998).
202. See id. at 792-93, 966 P.2d at 896.
203. 91 Wash. App. 1, 26, 951 P.2d 1151, 1164 (1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 979 P.2d
374 (Wash. 1999).
204. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70C (1998).
205. King County, 91 Wash. App. at 26, 951 P.2d at 1164. See also WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70C.030(1)(a)(ii) (1998).
206. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.295(3)-(4).
207. See id. § 36.70A.295(5).
208. See id. § 34.05.518 (1998).
209. See Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Skagit County, 135 Wash. 2d 542, 958
P.2d 962 (1998).
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land use petitions, 210 statutory writs of certiorari2 11 constitutional writs
of certiorari,2  declaratory judgment actions, writs of mandamus,
214
and damage actions.15
Growth Board jurisdiction does not include state and local regu-
latory actions on proposed projects. 216 Aggrieved proponents or oppo-
nents must go to court for adjudication of GMA issues. Since 1995, a
petition under LUPA generally has been the exclusive means of
obtaining judicial review of project-level regulatory actions, and a
number of GMA cases have followed this route. Prior to LUPA,
judicial review of quasi-judicial regulatory approvals and denials was
available by statutory writ of certiorari, and at least one GMA case
reached court this way.217  Although Growth Board jurisdiction
includes "amendments" to development regulations,1 8 the state
supreme court has held that project-specific, quasi-judicial rezones
may not be appealed to the Board, and are subject only to judicial
219review.
The Washington Court of Appeals has held that declaratory
judgments are available only if there is no adequate remedy at law, and
that review by the extraordinary constitutional writ of certiorari is an
adequate remedy at law!22' Because both declaratory judgment actions
and constitutional writs of certiorari are available only when there is
no adequate remedy at law, which one is preempted when both are
potentially available? The court of appeals held that a declaratory
judgment action becomes unavailable under such circumstances.
210. See, e.g., Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861,
947 P.2d 1208 (1997); Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 974 P.2d 863 (Wash.
App. Ct. 1999); King County, 91 Wash. App. 1, 951 P.2d 1151 (1998) affd in part, rev'd in part,
979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).
211. See, e.g., Washington State Dep't of Corrections v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wash.
App. 521, 937 P.2d 1119 (1997).
212. See King County, 91 Wash. App. at 17 n.29, 951 P.2d at 1159; cf. Torrance v. King
County, 136 Wash. 2d 783, 787-91, 966 P.2d at 893-96 (1998) (constitutional writ unavailable to
review Growth Board decision).
213. See, e.g., Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wash. 2d 345, 884 P.2d 1326 (1994);
Anderson 1, 123 Wash. 2d 151, 868 P.2d 116 (1994).
214. See, e.g., Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. Washington State Boundary Review
Bd. for King County, 127 Wash. 2d 759, 903 P.2d 953 (1995); Save Our State Park v. Board of
Clallarn County Comm'rs, 74 Wash. App. 637, 875 P.2d 673 (1994).
215. See, e.g., Anderson II, 124 Wash. 2d 834, 881 P.2d 240 (1994); Jones v. King County,
74 Wash. App. 467, 874 P.2d 853 (1994).
216. See Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 867-68, 947 P.2d at 1211-12.
217. See Washington State Department of Corrections v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wash.
App. 521, 937 P.2d 1119 (1997).
218. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.280(1)(a); .290(2).
219. Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 867-68, 947 P.2d at 1212.
220. See City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Community Council, 91 Wash. App. 461, 952
P.2d 267 (1998).
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Because the constitutional writ is consistently characterized as a last
resort,22' a legal safety net based on the judiciary's inherent power to
protect the citizenry against governmental abuse, this holding is sur-
S1 222prising.
In APA appeals of Growth Board decisions, timely filing of the
petition and service on all parties of record 223 is jurisdictional and,
thus, strictly required as a prerequisite to judicial review. 224 Failure to
comply with APA's jurisdictional prerequisites is fatal. Substantial
compliance does not suffice. The strictness of the requirement is
demonstrated by the dismissal of a petition in Litowitz v. Federal
Way. 22s Five couples appealed the city's GMA plan to the Growth
Board.226 After the Board's decision, only two of the couples appealed
to superior court.227 They served their petition on the Board, the city,
and other adverse parties, but not on the other three couples who had
been allied and apparently represented by the same attorney in the
Board proceedings. 22  The fact that they were actually aware of the
petition was irrelevant because substantial compliance did not suf-fice. 22 9
Similarly, in Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of
Skagit County,"' petitions were dismissed for failure to serve several
parties.231 In both cases, the courts allowed the service deficiency to be
raised at any time by parties other than those unserved because the
requirement was jurisdictional. The APA provision has been
amended to allow service on the parties' attorneys.232 However, the
221. See Torrance v. King County, 136 Wash. 2d 783, 787-88, 966 P.2d 891, 893 (1998).
222. The Bellevue decision was also surprising in allowing review by constitutional writ even
though only the functionally and legally distinct statutory writ of certiorari was sought. See gen-
erally SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE, supra note 2, at §§ 8.2 and 8.3.
223. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.542(2) (1998).
224. See Union Bay Preservation Coalition v. Cosmos Dev. and Admin. Corp., 127 Wash.
2d 614, 617-20, 902 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (1998).
225. 93 Wash. App. 66, 966 P.2d 422 (1998).
226. See Litowitz, 93 Wash. App. at 67, 966 P.2d at 422.
227. Id. at 68, 966 P.2d at 422.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 69, 966 P.2d at 423.
230. 135 Wash. 2d 542, 553-57, 958 P.2d 962, 967-69 (1998).
231. Thus, even though the attorneys of the unserved parties were served, the claims of the
groups included in the phrase "Skagit Surveyors and Engineers" were not adjudicated despite the
groups' top-billing in the title of the case. Skagit County's petition, properly served on all
parties, was adjudicated. The court rejected the argument that the county's petition also should
have been dismissed because while all parties in the Board proceedings were served, they were not
all named in the body of the petition as required by RCW 34.05.546(5) (1998). The court
declined to hold that strict compliance with RCW 34.05.546 was a jurisdictional requirement.
Substantial compliance with this nonjurisdictional APA requirement sufficed.
232. The Skagit Surveyors court acknowledged that "a different result would be reached in
this case now, under the amended version of the statute." 135 Wash. 2d at 557, 958 P.2d at 969.
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requirements remain strict and jurisdictional, and must be satisfied
within the thirty-day limitation period, which also is jurisdictional.233
1. Standing
Resolution of GMA issues may implicate both administrative
and judicial standing. The GMA generally grants administrative
standing234 to petition the Growth Boards to the state, GMA counties
and cities, persons who have participated orally or in writing in local
government proceedings on the matter appealed, persons certified by
the Governor, and "persons aggrieved" under the APA. 235  GMA's
administrative standing provisions are extremely generous, allowing
anyone who has spoken or submitted written comments in a local pro-
ceeding on GMA issues to appeal local plans and regulations related to
such issues to the Growth Boards.2 36 A participant in local GMA pro-
ceedings has standing to petition the Growth Boards even if the person
would suffer no injury within the zone of interests protected by the
GMA that could be redressed by the Board.237
GMA's judicial standing provision does not employ the language
of its administrative standing provisions. The Act tersely authorizes
any "party aggrieved" by a final decision of the Hearings Board to
appeal to superior court.238 Is any "party" to a Board proceeding who
is disappointed by the outcome "aggrieved" and entitled to seek judi-
cial review? This question was answered in the affirmative.239 The
Washington Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the GMA's
"party aggrieved" should be regarded as equivalent to APA's "person
aggrieved," which has been interpreted much more narrowly than
233. See Union Bay Preservation Coalition v. Cosmos Dev. and Admin. Corp., 127 Wash.
2d 614, 617, 902 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1995). See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
234. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(2) and (3). Only cities and the governor may
appeal countywide planning policies to the Growth Boards. See WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A.210(6).
235. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.530 (1998).
236. See id.
237. Under the APA, RCW 34.05.530 (1998), a person is aggrieved or adversely affected
and has a standing to obtain judicial review of agency action when:
(1) The agency action has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice that person;
(2) That person's asserted interests are among those that the agency was required to
consider when it engaged in the agency action challenged; and
(3) A judgment in favor of that person would substantially eliminate or redress the
prejudice to that person caused or likely to be caused by the agency action.
See also Seattle Building and Construction Trades Council v. The Apprenticeship and Training
Council, 129 Wash. 2d 787, 920 P.2d 581 (1996); William R. Anderson, The 1988 Washington
Administrative Procedure Act - An Introduction, 64 WASH. L. REV. 781, 825 (1989).
238. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300(5).
239. See Project for Informed Citizens v. Columbia County, 92 Wash. App. 290, 294-97,
966 P.2d 338, 340-42 (1998).
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GMA's extremely broad administrative standing provisions."' The
court acknowledged GMA's ambiguity, but could not "discern why
the GMA would grant party status at the Board level, then withdraw
it at the superior court level through the use of the APA standard." ''
The court concluded that GMA grants standing in superior court to
any petitioner with standing before the Board who failed to receive the
relief sought from the Board.242  Other GMA cases that have
addressed standing issues have applied general state standing doc-
trine."'
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The only GMA case to explicitly address exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies as a prerequisite to judicial review was Citizens of
Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon.244 The court acknowledged
that exhaustion would require an appeal to the Growth Board of issues
within its jurisdiction as a precondition to judicial review. However,
the court concluded that a petition to the Board was not available
because the challenged city regulatory action approving a Planned
Unit Development (PUD) fell "outside the scope of review granted to
the Board."2 The court did not address the potential argument that
PUD approval requires a zoning amendment, as the court acknowl-
edged, and amendments of development regulations are explicitly
within the Board's statutory jurisdiction.246 Because the court averred
that the "Board cannot render a decision on a specific development
project, '  perhaps it would interpret the Board's jurisdiction over"amendment" as including only legislative amendments of broad
applicability, and not amendments to accommodate a specific project.
Apparently, the court found it unnecessary to address the argument,
because the PUD was challenged as violative of the city's underlying
zoning and not of GMA requirements, which are the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Growth Board.
240. See id. at 295,966 P.2d at 341.
241. Id. at 296, 966 P.2d at 342.
242. Id. at 296-97, 966 P.2d at 342.
243. See Postema v. Snohomish County, 83 Wash. App. 574, 922 P.2d 176 (1996); cf.
Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash. 2d 542, 556, 958
P.2d 962, 969 (1998) (holding that anyone has standing to raise jurisdictional issues.); Citizens
for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 867 n.2, 947 P.2d 1208, 1211
(1997) (noting that LUPA provides that a petitioner who has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies lacks standing); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70C.060(2) (1998).
244. 133 Wash. 2d 861, 947 P.2d 1208 (1997).
245. Id. at 868, 947 P.2d at 1212.
246. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.280(1)(a), .290(2).
247. Citizens of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 868, 947 P.2d at 1212.
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The Mount Vernon case also addressed the issue preclusion
branch of the exhaustion doctrine, rejecting the argument that the
petitioners were precluded from arguing that the PUD approval vio-
lated city zoning because that issue had not been raised in the city's
regulatory proceedings. The court concluded that the general argu-
ments made by the citizen-opponents in such proceedings were broad
enough to include the specific issue raised in court, sympathetically
observing that "[i]individual citizens did not have to raise technical,
legal arguments with the specificity and to the satisfaction of a trained
land use attorney during a public hearing." '248 The court's empathetic
permissiveness is at odds with prior decisions, which the court
acknowledged but did not overrule.
249
The GMA, as interpreted by the courts, creates powerful incen-
tives for opponents of local land use policies to appeal them to the
Growth Boards. In addition to the exhaustion doctrine, other GMA
features compel local dissidents to file a timely Growth Board appeal
or be foreclosed from contesting local GMA enactments. Even sup-
porters of local GMA implementation should intervene in Board
appeals, lest they be barred from obtaining judicial review if the Board
should decide that the local policies or regulations they favor violate
the GMA.
The saga of Mr. Torrance"' teaches an important lesson. He
successfully lobbied King County to include in its plan and regu-
lations provisions that would allow an acceptable use of his land.
However, the fruits of his labors were jeopardized when local dissi-
dents appealed his favored provisions to the Growth Board. Appar-
ently, he failed to monitor whether appeals had been filed, did not
know about the appeal and, thus, did not intervene in the Board
proceeding to protect his interests. The Board ruled that his favored
provisions violated the GMA."' Mr. Torrance did not seek judicial
review of the Board's decision. Because he had not become a "party"
by intervening, he probably lacked standing to obtain judicial review
as he was not a "party aggrieved." 22 The court's opinion does not say
whether Mr. Torrance participated in county proceedings after
remand from the Board. However, a county amendment eliminated
his favored provisions, and he did not appeal the amendment to the
248. Id. at 870, 947 P.2d at 1213.
249. See, e.g., Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 856, 586 P.2d
470 (1978).
250. See Torrance v. King County, 136 Wash. 2d 783, 966 P.2d 891 (1998).
251. See id. at 785,966 P.2d at 892.
252. See Project for Informed Citizens v. Columbia County, 92 Wash. App. 290, 296-97,
966 P.2d 338, 341-42 (1998).
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Board. He apparently did not seek judicial review of the Board's
determination that the county's amendments were in compliance with
the Act.
Subsequently, during the annual consideration of proposed
amendments, Mr. Torrance unsuccessfully requested an amendment
that would have reinstated his favored regulation." 3 This time he did
appeal the county's action denying his requested amendment to the
Board. But the Board rejected his appeal, ruling that it was too late to
appeal the earlier county actions, and the county's mere failure to
amend did not violate the Act. In effect, the Board ruled that one who
has failed to file a timely appeal of a county enactment generally
cannot overcome the omission by requesting an amendment that
would acceptably change the previous enactment and then appealing
the county's denial to the Board. No court has decided whether the
Board's refusal to hear such appeals is in compliance with the GMA.
Mr. Torrance did not seek judicial review of the Board's rejection of
his appeal. However, prior to the Board's decision, he had filed a
LUPA action, later amended to include a request for constitutional
writ of certiorari, challenging the county's refusal to adopt his pro-
posed amendments. The supreme court held that review of the
county's action could be obtained only through a GMA/APA appeal
of the Board's decision for the county. In the final analysis, because of
his tactical choices, Mr. Torrance was barred from obtaining both
Board and judicial review of the county's action.
Another potential trap for citizens aggrieved by local GMA
enactments was removed by the state supreme court in its most recent
GMA case.254 The Board, trial court, and court of appeals all had
endorsed the proposition that where the countywide planning policy
directed the designation of a specific urban growth area, the Board
lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the UGA designation in the
county's comprehensive plan violated the Act's UGA limitations.
The trial court and appellate court both ruled that the Board only had
authority to review the directive CPPs if timely appealed."' This
interpretation of the Act would have effectively foreclosed citizens
from obtaining Growth Board review of county compliance with the
Act's UGA requirements, because the right to appeal CPPs to the
Board is limited only to cities or the governor.256
253. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.130.
254. King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d
374 (Wash. 1999).
255. Seeid.at379.
256. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.210(6).
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The state supreme court reversed, holding that while CPPs are
indeed directive and binding upon counties and their constituent cit-
ies, aggrieved citizens do have recourse. They are entitled to Board
review of local GMA provisions that are directed by CPPs, even if the
directive CPPs were not appealed to the Board.257 The court reasoned
that this interpretation of the Act was necessary to effectuate GMA's
public participation2 8 and UGA designation25 provisions.260
3. Timeliness
The only timeliness issue adjudicated in a reported GMA case
261
was unusual. The Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hear-
ings Board, upon reconsideration, decided that King County violated
the GMA by improperly designating Bear Creek Urban Planned
Developments (UPDs) in its UGA. The Board reasoned that (1) the
CPPs did not direct this UGA designation and (2) the county had not
otherwise justified the designation under GMA's UGA standards.262
The county appealed to King County Superior Court, contending that
(1) the CPPs did direct the UGA designation, and (2) the county had
justified the designation. Opponents of the Bear Creek UGA
designation, "Friends of the Law," also appealed the Board's decision,
but to Snohomish County Superior Court, asserting that the Board
improperly limited its jurisdiction and raising issues about the validity
of the county plan during the period of remand after the Board's
determination of noncompliance. 263  This lawsuit was dismissed
because of service of process defects.264 Friends of the Law then filed
the same appeal as a "cross-petition" in the county's superior court
action more than thirty days after service of the Growth Board's final
order. Friends of the Law's cross-petition was dismissed as untimely
under the GMA and APA thirty-day limitation period.265
Friends of the Law argued that the cross-petition was timely
because it raised issues ancillary to King County's petition and was
filed within the time limits under the civil rules. The court disagreed,
holding that because the issues raised in the cross-petition were not
ancillary, the civil rules were inapplicable, the APA limitation period
257. See King County, 979 P.2d at 381-82.
258. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.140.
259. See id. § 36.70A.110(5).
260. See King County, 979 P.2d at 382.
261. King County, 91 Wash. App. 1, 16-20, 951 P.2d 1151, 1159-61 (1998), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).
262. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110(1)-(4).
263. See King County, 91 Wash. App. at 17 n.29, 951 P.2d at 1159.
264. See id. at 17 n.30, 951 P.2d at 1160.
265. See id. at 17, 951 P.2d at 1160.
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was jurisdictional and, thus, the cross-petition must be dismissed.
The court sympathetically rejected the policy argument that the
court's rigid application of the thirty-day limit to both appeals and
cross appeals would lead to wasteful and unnecessary filing of
protective appeals. However, unfortunately, because the APA con-
tains no separate period for filing cross-petitions, and because APA's
service and timeliness requirements are jurisdictional,266 the court said
the persuasive policy argument must be made to the legislature. The
state supreme court recently upheld the court of appeals on this issue,
observing that the APA's strict timeliness requirements "reflect the
high value placed on finality in administrative processes. t267
4. Mootness
In the King County case, the court also decided that an important
GMA issue was moot. The Growth Board had decided that a King
County UGA designation violated the GMA. After remand, the
county apparently articulated its justification for the designation. The
Board ruled that in compliance reviews after remand, its authority was
limited to determining only "procedural compliance and not substan-
tive compliance with the goals and requirements of the GMA." '268
Thus, the Board found procedural compliance because the county had
articulated justifications, but the Board declined to determine whether
they complied with the Act's substantive UGA provisions.
A citizen group appealed the Board's compliance determination,
challenging the Board's self-imposed limitation to reviewing only pro-
cedural compliance. However, because the superior court previously
had ruled that the Growth Board erred in finding the county's UGA
designation was not directed by the CPP and was not compliant with
GMA, the court ruled that the Board's compliance review should not
have happened and its propriety was moot. The court of appeals
agreed that the Growth Board erred in finding a GMA violation in the
first place because the Board lacked jurisdiction to decide whether a
UGA designation directed by the CPP complied with the Act. Thus,
the Board's compliance review was a legal nullity and the challenge
was moot. Despite the claim's mootness, the court acknowledged its
potential merit, observing that the "distinction between procedural
and substantive compliance.., is perplexing and may lack support in
266. See id. at 18-19, 951 P.2d at 1160-61.
267. King County, 979 P.2d at 383, (citing JEM Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communica-
tion Comm'n, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
268. King County, 91 Wash. App. 1, 21-22, 951 P.2d 1151, 1162 (1998) affd in part, rev'd
in part, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).
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the provisions of the GMA. ' 269 Nevertheless, the court declined to
invoke the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
The state supreme court recently reversed the court of appeals on
the mootness issue. 27" Because the supreme court reversed the trial
court and the court of appeals as to the Board's jurisdiction to decide
whether UGA designations directed by the CPP complied with
statutory requirements, the lawfulness of the UGA designation was no
longer moot, and that issue was remanded to the Board.271' The
supreme court noted that the Board's previous ruling-that it would
only determine procedural, and not substantive, compliance-was "an
anomaly, '272 and was abandoned by the Board in a subsequent unre-
lated case.273 The Board now reviews local corrective actions taken
after determinations of noncompliance for both procedural and sub-
stantive compliance.274
S. GMA Noncompliance v. "Invalidity": Effect on Vesting
When a Growth Board has ruled that local plan provisions or
regulations are violative of GMA's requirements, they are doomed,
but not dead, unless they are subject to an "invalidity" order or until,
after remand, they have been revised or repealed to comply with the
Act. A 1995 GMA amendment 275 was enacted to clarify ambiguity
about the legal status of local enactments after a Growth Board had
determined that they were not in compliance with GMA require-
ments, but before they were locally amended.
The Growth Boards have no authority to adopt and impose local
plan provisions or regulations. 276  The Boards' remedial powers are
limited to remanding noncompliant provisions to local government for
rectification within a specified period of time.277 Upon failure to
achieve compliance after remand, the Board may recommend that the
governor impose sanctions. 27" As a result of the Boards' limited reme-
dial powers, the uncertain legal status of noncompliant local provisions
has tended to paralyze development, and the duration of the paralysis
could be extended during judicial review of Board decisions.
269. Id. at 23, 951 P.2d at 1163.
270. See King County, 979 P.2d at 382.
271. See id.
272. Id. at 380 n.4.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 347 § 110 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300).
276. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.300,302, 330.
277. See id. § 36.70A.300(3)(b).
278. See id. § 36.70A.330(3).
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The 1995 amendment, along with a more definitive 1997 amend-
ment,279 brought noncompliant GMA plans and regulations out of
limbo by providing that "a finding of noncompliance and an order of
remand shall not affect the validity of comprehensive plans and devel-
opment regulations during the period of remand ... unless the Board
makes a determination of invalidity."2 ' The statute goes on to
provide that "[a] determination of invalidity is prospective in effect
and does not extinguish rights that vested under state or local law
before receipt of the board's order by the city or county. ,281
Thus, the court of appeals held, and the state supreme court
recently affirmed, that, absent an "invalidity" determination, county
plan UGA designations remained in effect and development applica-
tions were properly processed after a Growth Board had found the
UGA designations violative of the Act.8 2 A Board determination of
invalidity must be included in a final order, supported by findings of
fact and conclusions of law, that the continued validity of specified
noncompliant plan provisions or regulations would "substantially
interfere with the fulfillment of [GMA] goals. '283  The court of
appeals rejected the notion of an implied determination of invalidity
and refused to impose the determination upon the Board as a matter of
law.
284
Once a determination of invalidity has been properly issued and
received by a city or county, the specified local provisions become
legally inoperative and are not subject to vesting, except for subse-
quently filed permit applications for owner-built single-family homes,
remodeling and expansion of existing structures, and lot line adjust-
ments. 285 The Supreme Court of Washington narrowly construed the
Board's authority in holding that pre-GMA regulations were not sub-
ject to a determination of "invalidity. ' 286  Having so held, the court
279. 1997 Wash. Laws ch. 429 §§ 1-22, (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.300,
.302, .320, .3201, .330, .335).
280. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300(4).
281. Id. § 36.70A.302(2).
282. See King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 91
Wash. App. 1, 27-28, 951 P.2d 1151, 1165 (1998), affd in part, rev'd in part, 979 P.2d 374
(Wash. 1999).
283. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.302(1).
284. Accord Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash.
2d 542, 559-61, 958 P.2d 962, 970-72 (1998).
285. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.302(3).
286. See Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 557-68, 958 P.2d at 970-74. The court
acknowledged an exception to the rule if the ordinance adopting a GMA plan or regulations
contains a "savings clause intended to review prior policies or regulations in the event the new
plan or regulations are determined to be invalid." Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 560, 958
P.2d at 971. In such cases, the Board has authority to decide "whether the prior policies or
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declined to reach the issue of whether application of GMA's invalidity
provisions, by creating a regulatory void, would violate the constitu-
tional dimension of Washington's vested rights doctrine. If there is a
constitutional right to determine the regulations governing a proposed
development, is an invalidity order, which precludes the opportunity
to vest, unconstitutional?287
6. Standards of Review
The GMA does not specify standards of judicial review. Thus,
courts apply standards of review applicable to the means of obtaining
judicial review employed by the claimant. GMA issues are most com-
monly raised through APA petitions, as this is the exclusive means of
reviewing Growth Board decisions. The APA standard of review has
been discussed in several GMA cases, but apparently has not been an
issue.288 Standards of review are also specified in the other statutes
authorizing judicial review. Standards of review applicable to consti-
tutional writs of certiorari are the product of judicial interpretation.289
A potential source of confusion is the relationship between the
standard of administrative review applied by the Board and standards
of judicial review applied by courts reviewing Board decisions. The
GMA originally directed the Boards to find GMA noncompliance if
the petitioner persuaded a Board by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.29 ° A 1997 GMA amendment changed the standard to the more
deferential clearly erroneous standard 291 and was accompanied by leg-
islative findings directing the Boards to accord local governments
broad discretion.292 A court applying this standard of judicial review
must include in its calculus the Board's standard of administrative
review. For example, if a court is applying the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, it must decide whether the Board was arbitrary and
capricious in deciding that a county GMA enactment was or was not
clearly erroneous.
Aside from the specific statutory standards of judicial review, the
courts traditionally have deferred to the legal interpretations of agen-
regulations are valid during the period of remand." Id.
287. See Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 578-79, 958 P.2d at 979-98 (Talmadge, J., dis-
senting.)
288. See, e.g., City of Redmond v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings
Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 45-46, 959 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1998); King County, 91 Wash. App. at 12-
13, 951 P.2d at 1157 affd inpart, rev'd inpart, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).
289. See, e.g., Saldin Securities v. Snohomish County, 134 Wash. 2d 288, 292-94, 949 P.2d
370, 373-74 (1998).
290. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(1) (amended 1997).
291. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3).
292. See id. § 36.70A.320(1).
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cies charged with administering a law.293 However, the courts have
stressed that they will defer to agency interpretations only when the
law is ambiguous and only when the interpretation is within the
agency's expertise.294 In GMA cases, the courts often must decide
whether to defer to a Growth Board or a local government. In the
King County case, the court of appeals deferred to the county's inter-
pretation, rather than the Board's, of an ambiguous countywide plan-
ning policy provision because it was the county's law.29
C. Constitutional Challenges
There have been several constitutional challenges of various
requirements of the GMA itself. In contrast, another case involved
constitutional claims based on devaluation of property caused by local
land use regulations implementing the GMA. All of the challenges
have been unsuccessful.
In Snohomish County v. Anderson,.. several elements of the Act,
including the provision for countywide planning policies and sanctions
for noncompliance by withholding various state revenue sources, were
challenged under the state constitution. All of the challenges were
dismissed on procedural grounds.
In Postema v. Snohomish County,297 similar constitutional chal-
lenges of the CPPs failed for lack of standing and justiciability. In
dicta, the court nevertheless discussed at some length a "one person,
one vote" equal protection challenge. Postema claimed that a com-
mittee of county and city elected officials charged with developing and
recommending a CPP violated his equal protection rights because, as a
county resident, he voted r'nly for the county members of the com-
mittee, while city residents voted for both city and county members.
The court said the claim was without merit because the committee was
purely advisory and possessed no governmental powers.
In Diehl v. Mason County,298 the county contended that broad
Growth Board discretion over the validity of local plans and regula-
tions made the GMA unconstitutionally vague. The court disagreed
with the general proposition because the Board's authority is limited
to determining whether local plans and regulations violate the specific
terms of the GMA or substantially interfere with its stated goals.
293. See, e.g., City of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46, 959 P.2d at 1094.
294. See, e.g., King County, 91 Wash. App. at 12-13, 951 P.2d at 1157, affd in part, rev'd
in part, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).
295. See id.
296. 124 Wash. 2d 834, 881 P.2d 240 (1994).
297. 83 Wash. App. 574, 922 P.2d 176 (1996).
298. 94 Wash. App. 645, 972 P.2d 543 (1999).
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Moreover, the court found the vagueness claim implausible in this
case because the county enactments found noncompliant by the Board
clearly violated specific requirements of the Act. The court also
rejected the argument that the Board's authority to invalidate the
enactments of local legislative bodies violated separation of powers.
The court disagreed that the Board is purely an executive body
encroaching on local legislatures. Rather, the court held that the
Board was properly authorized to act quasi-judicially to effectuate
state legislation.
In Jones v. King County,299 a landowner contended that county
regulations, apparently implementing GMA, greatly reduced permis-
sible development, thereby devaluing the land in violation of constitu-
tional taking and substantive due process limitations. The court
rejected the challenges under the distinctive regulatory taking and
substantive due process doctrines developed by the Washington
Supreme Court."'
D. Urban Growth and Rural Sprawl
The required concentration of population in urban growth areas
and the reciprocal prohibition of development at urban, or even sub-
urban, densities in rural areas are the Act's two most central and per-
vasive goals.3 1 Although the Act denies any order of priority among
its thirteen goals,30 2 it is fitting, and probably no accident, that "Urban
Growth" and "Rural Sprawl" top the list.3 3 By concentrating popu-
lation in tightly limited UGAs, public facilities and services can be
more efficiently provided, natural resource industries and environ-
mentally critical areas can be protected, and options for future
development can be preserved.3 4 Similarly, by severely restricting
299. 74 Wash. App. 467, 874 P.2d 853 (1994).
300. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993)
301. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.020(1) and (2); 36.70A.030(14), (15), and (16);
.110; .350; .360; .362; .365; .367 (1998).
302. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.020 (preamble).
303. See id. § 36.70A.020(1) and (2).
304. See generally Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1, at 872-73, 911-15, 936-37; Keith W.
Dearborn and Ann M. Gygi, Planners Panacea or Pandora's Box: A Realistic Assessment of the
Role of Urban Growth Areas in Achieving Growth Management Goals, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 975 (1993); GROWTH MANAGEMENT Div., WASH. STATE DEPT. OF COMMUNITY
DEV. [now known as "Community, Trade, and Economic Development"], THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF DESIGNATING URBAN GROWTH AREAS, SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR CRITERIA
AND DENSITIES (1992); GROWTH MANAGEMENT DIV., WASH. STATE DEPT. OF
COMMUNITY DEV., ISSUES IN DESIGNATING URBAN GROWTH AREAS, PROVIDING
ADEQUATE URBAN AREA LAND SUPPLY (1992); WASHINGTON STATE GROWTH
STRATEGIES COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: A GROWTH STRATEGY FOR WASHINGTON
STATE (Sept. 25, 1990).
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development densities and intensities in rural areas beyond UGA
limits, the need for inefficient systems of public facilities and services
can be avoided or minimized, natural resource industries and critical
areas (predominantly in rural areas) can be protected, and future
options can be preserved. While the reciprocal goals are unquestion-
ably rational, 30 5 they are politically controversial because, when rigor-
ously implemented and enforced, they may cause significant
redistribution of wealth and impose a settlement pattern at odds with
traditional American preferences.3" 6
Legislative controversy spawned statutory ambiguity about the
locus of the line between state mandate and local policy discretion in
determining the size of urban growth areas, development intensity
within them, and permissible uses and densities in rural areas.3" 7 The
Growth Boards generally have resolved the ambiguity in favor of state
mandate, expansively interpreting the Act to effectuate these central
goals.30 ' The legislature has responded with GMA amendments
affording greater discretion to counties and cities.30 9 So far, the courts
have defended the Act's broad goals for urban and rural areas, while
generally deferring to local policy choice in their implementation
unless contrary to clear and specific statutory requirements. The
courts have effectuated clearly manifested legislative intent in con-
struing ambiguous GMA provisions, but have refused to "legislate" to
rectify legislative impasse or default.310
The Supreme Court of Washington declined to extend the state's
vested rights doctrine to a petition to incorporate Vashon Island that
would have allowed incorporation outside the county UGA under a
305. See generally REAL ESTATE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE COST OF SPRAWL (1974) (a
highly publicized and influential study).
306. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS, 14-15
(1981), quoting B. BRUCE-BRIGGS, LAND USE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, NO LAND IS AN
ISLAND (1975) (" ... 85% of urban families wanted single family homes on good sized lots.
Gallup polls found that only one in eight Americans wishes to live in the cities, with about 30%
preferring suburbs, about the same choosing small towns, and a quarter of all Americans prefer-
ring to live on a farm. An Opinion Research Corporation survey found that one-third of Ameri-
cans would prefer open country. Americans want single-family homes, they want land, and the
only way to achieve this is 'suburban sprawl."')
307. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 1, at 881-96.
308. See discussion infra Part III.K.
309. See, e.g., 1997 Wash. Laws §§ 1-22.
310. See, e.g., Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135
Wash. 2d 542, 958 P.2d 962 (1998). But see Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County,
974 P.2d 863 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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previous statute.311 The court also construed ambiguous provisions of
the present statute to preclude incorporation outside the UGA.312
In another case, the state court of appeals declined to interfere
with an annexation decision of the City of Spokane.313 Arguments that
the UGA barred the annexation had no plausible legal basis at that
time, when neither the city or county had GMA plans, and the city
had not designated a UGA. The court rejected the argument that the
city was obligated to comply with the county's pre-GMA comprehen-
sive plan as legally groundless. The court also declined the invitation
to deny the annexation on the basis of GMA's "policy against urban
sprawl." The court reasoned that this GMA "policy" did "not apply
before the date the Act required GMA counties and cities to imple-
ment their comprehensive plans." '314 A more fundamental reason to
reject the argument would have been that GMA's sprawl avoidance
goal has no independent legal effect.315
There are two cases reviewing county UGA designations. In
King County,316 the state supreme court held that a UGA designation
specifically directed by the CPP was subject to Board review for com-
pliance with GMA's UGA limitations, even though the CPP had not
been appealed to the Board. After acrimonious public debate, the
county had included several "Bear Creek urban planned develop-
ments" (UPDs) within the UGA. A citizen group appealed the desig-
nations to the Board. After initially upholding the county, the Board,
upon reconsideration, decided that the CPP did not call for UGA
designation of the UPDs, and that the county had not otherwise justi-
fied the designation under the UGA provisions of the Act. The Board
ruled that the designations were noncompliant and remanded them to
the county. While developing additional justifications for the designa-
tions, the county obtained judicial review of the Board's decision and
won. The trial court and court of appeals held that the CPP did indi-
cate that the UPDs should be in the UGA, and found it unnecessary
to decide whether the designations otherwise satisfied the UGA
requirements of the GMA. The citizen group apparently had argued
that in addition to complying with the county's CPP, the designations
must comply with the UGA prescriptions of the GMA. The state
311. See Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. Washington State Boundary Review Bd.
for King County, 127 Wash. 2d 759, 903 P.2d 953 (1995).
312. See id. at 771-72, 903 P.2d at 959.
313. Glenrose Community Ass'n v. City of Spokane, 93 Wash. App. 839, 971 P.2d 82
(1999).
314. 93 Wash. App. at 849, 971 P.2d at 87.
315. See discussion infra Part III.L.
316. King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d
374 (Wash. 1999).
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supreme court reversed, holding that a CPP directive to designate a
specific UGA did not immunize the UGA designation from Board
review for compliance with the Act's UGA provision.317
The court of appeals was more deferential to the county than the
Board in the realm of the Act's UGA provisions, which may be
GMA's most definitive and potent substantive requirements. In
reversing the court of appeals, the state supreme court was not neces-
sarily shifting the balance of power from local government to the state.
The lower court's holding, that UGA designations (and, logically,
other local GMA enactments) mandated by the CPP were immune
from substantive review by the Board, would have made GMA
requirements practically unenforceable, contrary to the Act's manifest
intent.
However, in subjecting local UGA designations to Board review
for fidelity to the Act, the supreme court had no occasion to address
the relative discretion of local governments and the Board to interpret
ambiguous or broad language in the Act's UGA provisions. Subse-
quent to the Board's determination of noncompliance, the county jus-
tified the UGA designation under the Act's "fully contained
community" (FCC) provisions."3 On remand from the supreme
court, how much discretion the Board will accord the county's inter-
pretation and application of GMA's FCC provisions remains to be
seen.
In Diehl v. Mason County,319 the court upheld the Board's deter-
mination that the county's UGA designations violated the Act. The
court's decision is consistent with the general trend of judicial defer-
ence to local government in close cases, because this was not a close
case. The county clearly and substantially violated very specific,
unambiguous requirements of the Act. Counties are required to base
the size of UGAs, and development allowed within them, on the
Office of Financial Management (OFM) twenty-year population pro-
jections.2 The OFM projections are stated in terms of a range. The
size of UGAs and the urban321 development allowed within them must
be designed to accommodate population growth within the OFM
range. The county thought the OFM numbers were too low. 322
317. See id.
318. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.350(1)(a)-(2).
319. 94 Wash. App. 645, 972 P.2d 543 (1999).
320. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.120.
321. The OFM population projections are irrelevant to "nonurban" or "rural" growth. See
Clark County Natural Resources Council v. Clark County Citizens United, 94 Wash. App. 670,
972 P.2d 941 (1999).
322. See Diehl, 94 Wash. App. at 653, 972 P.2d at 547.
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However, rather than appealing the OFM population projection to the
Board,323 the county used its own higher forecasts.324 The Board's
decision on this clear and flagrant violation of one of the most specific
GMA requirements, which presumably infected the county's UGA
sizing and development regulations, was not a close case and was
summarily upheld by the court.
Every city must be within a county's UGA, no matter how
extensive a city's territory, how underdeveloped, and how little popu-
lation growth is projected. Perhaps this arbitrary GMA requirement
explains the Act's seemingly irrational allowance of natural resource
land designations within UGAs, which was at issue in City of
Redmond v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings
Board.32 Generally, it would contradict the purposes and functions of
both UGAs and natural resource industry protection to place them in
juxtaposition, because urban uses and intensities are deemed incom-
patible with the long-term commercial feasibility of resource indus-
tries,326 and large vacant tracts of land interspersed in urban areas
reduce the concentration of population and the efficiency of public
facilities and services. Indeed, such a land use pattern might be char-
acterized as sprawl.
Designation of agricultural land within a city might make sense
when the land has immense commercial agricultural utility and the
city has far-flung borders, little population, and a slow rate of growth.
But the City of Redmond hardly meets these specifications, and the
disputed areas that were designated "agricultural" apparently had
modest commercial agricultural utility. 7 The Growth Board ruled
that the city's designation violated the GMA.328 The supreme court
disagreed that the designation was improper, but agreed that the city
violated the GMA by failing to establish a system of transferable
development rights (TDR) where resource land has been designated
within a UGA. The court recognized that the TDR requirement was
designed both to compensate owners of severely restricted urban land
and to increase the density and intensity of development in the best-
suited urban areas to which development rights would be trans-
ferred.329
323. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(1)(b).
324. Diehl, 94 Wash. App. at 654-55, 972 P.2d at 547.
325. 136 Wash. 2d 38, 989 P.2d 1091 (1998).
326. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.060(1), .170.
327. See City of Redmond v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 136
Wash. 2d 38, 44, 49-50, 989 P.2d 1091, 1093, 1095-96.
328. See id. at 44, 989 P.2d at 1093.
329. See id. at 56-57 nn.9-10, 989 P.2d at 1099.
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If UGAs are designed to concentrate population and develop-
ment in limited areas, the other side of GMA's antisprawl coin is the
restriction of population and development in rural areas and resource
lands outside of UGAs. Here, too, the courts have supported GMA's
central purposes while deferring to local government except in cases of
clear violation of specific statutory requirements or flagrant violation
of broad GMA mandates. Moreover, the courts have refused to defer
to the Boards' expansive interpretations of GMA's substantive man-
dates.
In Clark County Natural Resources Council v. Clark County Citi-
zens United,33° the court strictly applied clear statutory language in
holding that Office of Financial Management (OFM) population pro-
jections331 were relevant only to county planning and regulatory provi-
sions for urban growth within UGAs. The OFM projections were
held legally irrelevant to county provisions for "nonurban" or "rural"
growth. The Growth Board relied upon OFM projections in finding
that the county's provisions for rural growth, in combination with
provisions for urban growth, were excessive. Because the Board
decided that county provisions for rural development violated the
GMA on the basis of this finding, the Board exceeded its authority.
The court applied a de novo standard of review to the legal question of
the effect of OFM population projections.
While acknowledging that deference to an agency's legal inter-
pretation is appropriate "when that will help the court achieve a
proper understanding of the statute, '332 this was not such an occasion.
The court stressed that "it is ultimately for the court to determine the
purpose and meaning of statutes, even when the court's interpretation
is contrary to that of the agency charged with carrying out the law. ,333
Because the "Board misread the statute and exceeded its authority,"
the court reasoned that deference "would perpetuate, not correct its
error. "334
In Diehl v. Mason County,335 the court upheld the Board's deter-
mination that the county's provisions for development in rural areas
violated the Act. It was not a close case. The county had designated
over 5000 acres for "rural activity centers" development at densities of
two to eight dwelling units per acre, approximating the densities
330. 94 Wash. App. 670, 972 P.2d 941 (1999).
331. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110.
332. Clark County Natural Resources Council, 94 Wash. App. at 677, 972 P.2d at 944.
333. Id., quoting Overton v. Economic Assistance Authority, 96 Wash. 2d 552, 555, 637
P.2d 652 (1981).
334. Id.
335. 94 Wash. App. 645, 972 P.2d 543 (1999).
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allowed in the county's UGA. In other rural areas, lots as small as 2.5
acres were allowed. The court did not specify the level of permissible
development intensity in rural areas, but generally affirmed the
Board's determinations, suggesting that what would be permissible in
rural areas would depend on the merit of the county's justification.
The Diehl case and Clark County Natural Resources Council v.
Clark County Citizens United336 were decided within a two week
period, but are inconsistent on a significant GMA issue. In Diehl, the
court relates with apparent approval one of the Board's reasons for
deciding the county's rural development regulations were noncompli-
ant-that, in combination with urban development, they would allow
population growth exceeding the OFM projection.337 The subsequent
Clark County Citizens United case emphatically decided that OFM
projections were irrelevant to "nonurban" or "rural" growth.338 Yet
the Diehl case, decided about a week earlier, is not mentioned. Pre-
sumably, the reasoning in Diehl that is inconsistent with Clark County
Citizens United, and probably was not necessary for its decision, is not
good law.
In a case that hinged upon vesting, the court of appeals decided
that interim UGA designations constituted development regulations
and trumped pre-GMA development regulations that would have
allowed the proposed development.339  The County had granted
approvals to a proposed plat and planned unit development (PUD)
outside the UGA in Kitsap County. Under PUD regulations in effect
at the time of application, when vesting occurred, the approved den-
sity of roughly one dwelling unit per acre was allowed. However, the
site was outside the interim UGA that had been adopted prior to the
time of vesting. The court held that the interim UGA was a develop-
ment regulation compelled by state law and, thus, preempted the
PUD regulations that permitted the approved density at the time of
vesting. This case followed the judicial trend to effectuate GMA's
central purpose of concentrating growth and avoiding sprawl. How-
ever, it is also a rare example of liberal construction of GMA require-
ments to override local government that the supreme court has been
unwilling to do.34°
336. 94 Wash. App. 670, 972 P.2d 941 (1999).
337. Diehl, 94 Wash. App. at 655-57, 972 P.2d at 547-49.
338. Clark County Citizens United, 94 Wash. App. at 676, 972 P.2d at 943-44.
339. See Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 974 P.2d 863 (Wash. Ct. App.)
(1999).
340. See Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash. 2d
542, 958 P.2d 962 (1998).
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The courts and, to a lesser extent, the Boards, afford wide lati-
tude to local attempts to meet broadly or vaguely stated GMA
requirements. However, local default cannot possibly satisfy such
requirements. In Diehl v. Mason County, the Board found that the
county had made no attempt whatsoever to comply with GMA's open
space requirement that each county include "greenbelts and open
space areas in its GMA element" and "identify open space corridors
within and between urban growth areas." '34 1 Because the county had
not even mentioned open space in its UGA element, the court sum-
marily upheld the Board's finding of noncompliance.
E. Concurrency
No case has addressed the ultimate substantive requirement that
local governments deny proposed development approval if the pro-
posal would cause the level of services on local transportation facilities
to fall below local standards in the transportation element of the com-
prehensive plan.342 The court of appeals has upheld a Board finding of
noncompliance based on numerous deficiencies in the capital facilities
element of the county's plan.343 Most significantly, the court rejected
the county's argument that the GMA required level of service stan-
dards only for transportation facilities. The court inferred a level of
service requirement for other public facilities from GMA capital
facilities planning requirements relating to inventories of existing
facilities and proposed locations and capacities of new or expanded
facilities.344
F. Essential Public Facilities
The potentially powerful GMA requirement that local plans and
regulations accommodate essential public facilities (EPFs)345 was
instrumental in a court of appeals decision invalidating a city council's
disapproval of a conditional use permit for a state work release facility,
an EPF. a*6 The court held that the planning director's decision
granting the permit was supported by substantial evidence and that
the city council improperly relied on evidence of the irrational fears of
neighbors in overturning the director's decision. The court reasoned
341. 94 Wash. App. at 659, 972 P.2d at 550.
342. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(6)(b).
343. See Diehl, 94 Wash. App. at 657-58, 972 P.2d at 549.
344. See id.
345. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.200(2).
346. See Washington State Dep't of Corrections v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wash. App.
521, 937 P.2d 1119 (1997).
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that under the Act's EPF provision, irrational fears could not be the
basis for precluding the siting of the work release facility.
G. Housing
One case has addressed GMA's broadly stated obligation to pro-
vide housing for all economic segments of the population.347 In Diehl
v. Mason County,348 the court upheld the Board's determination that
the county had violated the duty to "make adequate provisions for
existing and projected [housing] needs of all economic segments of the
community." '349 The Board's counterintuitive reasoning, which the
court uncritically accepted, accords little policy discretion to local gov-
ernment and immense power to the Boards. In the same decision, the
Board had faulted the city for allowing too much housing with over-
sized UGAs and greatly excessive density in over 5,000 acres of rural
activity centers! The county proudly argued that by such measures it
was providing for affordable housing. The Board implausibly
responded that under the county's plan and regulations so much
housing would be built that new urban infrastructure would be
needed, and because the costs of such facilities would have to be borne
by the new housing, it would not be affordable. Under the Board's
and court's reasoning, any local plan could be found violative of this
GMA housing requirement.
H. Critical Areas
Two cases have addressed GMA's critical area requirements. In
Diehl v. Mason County,50 the Board included in the long list of the
county's sins the failure to adequately protect351 aquifer recharge areas,
one of the Act's five categories of critical areas.3 2 The Board reasoned
that the county's measures addressing hazardous waste, water quality,
and the "effects of development" were "laudable," but insufficient.
313
The Board faulted the county for failing to protect aquifers from
threats other than hazardous waste and sewage, such as agricultural
and household chemicals, animal waste, and the "effects of increased
development.... "354  The Board also found the county deficient
because many of the protections mentioned in its plan and regulations
347. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.020(4), .070(2).
348. 94 Wash. App. 645, 972 P.2d 543 (1999).
349. See Diehl, 94 Wash. App. at 658, 972 P.2d at 549.
350. 94 Wash. App. 645, 972 P.2d 543.
351. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.060(2).
352. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.030(5).
353. See Diehl, 94 Wash. App. at 658, 972 P.2d at 549.
354. Id.
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were works in progress that had not been adopted. The court
embraced the Board's reasoning and concluded that the county had
not satisfied GMA's duty to protect aquifers.
In the most recent GMA case, HEAL v. City of Seattle,3"' the
court of appeals addressed two issues related to the Act's requirement
that "[iun designating and protecting critical areas under this chapter,
counties and cities shall include the best available science in develop-
ing policies and development regulations to protect the functions and
values of critical areas."356 The Board had held that it had jurisdiction
to review local "regulations," but not local "policies" related to critical
area protection, because the GMA only required local governments to
adopt critical area regulations, not policies.3"7
The court sympathetically disagreed with the Board's strict con-
struction of its statutory authority. The court held that if a city or
county elects to adopt critical area policies, they are within Board
jurisdiction for the "limited purpose of reviewing whether the policies
are in compliance with the requirement to include the best available
science in the process of developing the policy."3"8
The Board had also decided that the "best available science"
requirement was procedural, rather than substantive. This was an
issue on which the Boards disagree. The court of appeals, on the basis
of the process-oriented statutory language, as well as analogous federal
cases construing a similar requirement in the federal Endangered Spe-
cies Act,359 agreed with the Central Puget Sound Board. The court
held that best available science must be included in the record and
substantively considered in the development of critical area policies
and regulations.36 In so holding, the court stressed that the best avail-
able science requirement was not intended to dictate "any particular
substantive outcome" or to be the sole factor to be considered. 6'
The court concluded that the legislature intended local govern-
ments to balance such scientific evidence with many other "goals and
factors to fashion locally appropriate regulations." '362  The court
observed that the "Legislature has given great deference to the sub-
stantive outcome of the balancing process.'363
355. 979 P.2d 864 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
356. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.172(1).
357. See HEAL, 979 P.2d at 867.
358. Id.
359. See id. at 869-70, citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Louisiana v. Verity,
853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1988).
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I. Natural Resource Lands
In two cases, the courts have reviewed issues concerning the
proper designation of resource lands, but not the requisite protection
of natural resource industries. In both cases the court upheld the des-
ignation criteria employed by local government and ruled that the
Boards had imposed improper criteria. The cases have nothing else in
common.
In City of Redmond v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management
Hearings Board,364 the city had designated fallow valley land as agri-
cultural resource land. The Board ruled that the designation was
improper for two reasons. First, the land failed to satisfy either of the
two statutory designation standards. The record did not show that it
was primarily devoted to agricultural use and that it had long-term
commercial agricultural significance.36 Second, the city failed to
establish a program of transferable development rights (TDRs),366 as
the Act requires when resource lands are designated within a UGA.
367
The court upheld the Board's decision on the basis of the city's failure
to establish a TDR program but devoted most of the opinion to dicta
disagreeing with the Board's interpretation of one of the two statutory
designation standards. 3" The Board had ruled that the landowner's
actual use and intent determined whether land was "primarily devoted
to" commercial agricultural use. The court disagreed, concluding that
the land could be "devoted" to agricultural use by the city's zoning.
The court ignored the fact that the Board had also based its disagree-
ment with the city's designation on the lack of any evidence in the
record that the land had long-term commercial significance. 69
While in the Redmond case the Board had ruled that the city's
agricultural designation criteria were too strict, in Manke Lumber
Company v. Dieh137 the Board had ruled that Mason County's forest
designation criteria were too permissive. The Board had ruled that the
county violated the GMA by (1) employing, as designation criteria, a
5,000-acre minimum parcel size and property tax classification as of a
date prior to establishing the criterion; (2) mapping designated forest
land before adopting designation criteria; and (3) excluding land that
should have been designated. 37' The court reversed the Board, hold-
364. 136 Wash. 2d 38, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998).
365. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.030(2).
366. See City of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 44, 959 P.2d at 1093.
367. See. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.060(4).
368. See City of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 49-53, 959 P.2d at 1095-97.
369. See id. at 49-50, 959 P.2d at 1095-96.
370. 91 Wash. App. 793, 959 P.2d 1173 (1998).
371. See Manke Lumber Co., 91 Wash. App. at 800, 959 P.2d at 177.
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ing that the county's interpretation of the designation criteria was
within its discretion under the Act and administrative "minimum
guidelines,"3"' there was not substantial evidence supporting the
Board's conclusion that the county had improperly mapped the parcels
before adopting designation criteria, and there was no evidence of any
excluded parcel. In holding that the Board had exceeded its authority,
the court stressed the broad range of local discretion in GMA imple-
373mentation.
J. Countywide Planning Policies
The supreme court decided Snohomish County v. Anderson in two
installments. In Anderson I374 the court held that countywide planning
372. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-190-060-(3) -060(5) (1999).
373. See MankeLumber Co., 91 Wash. App. at 803-04, 959 P.2d at 1179:
The GMA directs counties and cities to determine what land is "primarily devoted
to... long-term commercial timber production .... RCW 36.70A.030(8). The
GMA confers broad discretion on local governments making this determination. The
Washington State Growth Strategies Commission's chair, in a cover letter, explained
to Governor Gardner the rationale for conferring discretion on local governments as
follows: "[O]ur strategy's success rests primarily on planning decisions being made at
the local level and those plans being given a presumption of validity." "The Commis-
sion believes the foundation blocks of a statewide growth strategy are local govern-
ments. Locally elected officials working with their citizenry are best able to tailor
broad growth policies to their communities." FINAL REPORT OF THE WASHING-
TON STATE GROWTH STRATEGIES COMMISSION: A GROWTH STRATEGY FOR
WASHINGTON STATE [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], at 4 (September 1990).
The state should play a critical role in assisting local governments and regional
organizations in carrying out its growth strategy. As part of that role the state
should develop guidelines and regulations and provide technical assistance for
planning and implementing all aspects of growth legislation. However, the state
should facilitate rather than dictate local comprehensive planning, and should
speed up rather than slow down its process. The state should not become an
unwieldy layer of review and approval, but a facilitator and an arbiter for local
government.
Final Report, at 15.
In 1997, the Legislature reiterated its intention that, within the general GMA frame-
work, local governments assume broad discretion in developing specific comprehen-
sive plans tailored to local circumstances:
In recognition of the broad range of discretion that may be exercised by counties
and cities consistent with the requirements of this chapter, the legislature intends
for the boards to grant deference to counties and cities in how they plan for growth,
consistent with the requirements and goals of this chapter. Local comprehensive
plans and development regulations require counties and cities to balance priori-
ties and options for action in full consideration of local circumstances. The
legislature finds that while this chapter requires local planning to take place
within a framework of state goals and requirements, the ultimate burden and
responsibility for planning, harmonizing the planning goals of this chapter, and
implementing a county's or city's future rests with that community.
RCW 36.70A.320(1) (emphasis added).
374. 123 Wash. 2d 151,868 P.2d 116 (1994).
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policies (CPPs) were not subject to referendum because the GMA
requires the "legislative authority," rather than the county as a
governmental entity, to adopt CPPs.375 Following a line of Washing-
ton cases, the court reasoned that the legislature, by assigning the duty
to the county legislative authority, manifested intent that its decision
not be subject to referendum. This conclusion was buttressed by the
elaborate statutory procedural requirements for development and
adoption of CPPs, which, the court reasoned, could not be satisfied
through the referendum process. While this reasoning is superficially
appealing, it is vulnerable to the argument that law is not made but
rejected if a referendum is successful. Following voter rejection, the
county legislative body could then go through the statutory process
again. The court also suggested that CPPs should not be subject to
local referendum because CPPs are not matters of local governance,
but are part of a statewide program of growth management.376 While
so deciding, the court stressed that the CPP did not affect any legal
rights.377
In Anderson I78, the court rejected a flurry of constitutional
challenges of the GMA, again stressing that the CPP "does not estab-
lish, dissolve or modify any legal rights." '379 In Postema v. Snohomish
County,380 the court of appeals rejected several constitutional chal-
lenges of the CPP process that were not properly raised in Anderson II.
Again, the court minimized the legal effect of CPPs. 81  But in King
County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board,"2
the court breathed potency into a CPP. The court held that the CPP
was binding upon the county and, presumably, its constituent cities.
The court reasoned that CPPs are:
the major tool provided in the GMA to ensure that the compre-
hensive plans of each city within a county agree with each other.
If the CPPs served merely as a nonbinding guide, municipalities
would be at liberty to reject CPP provisions and the CPPs would
not ensure consistency between local comprehensive plans.383
375. See Anderson 1, 123 Wash. 2d at 156, 868 P.2d at 118.
376. See id. at 159, 868 P.2d at 120 (noting that permitting the referendum would "jeop-
ardize an entire state plan and thus would extend beyond a matter of local concern.")
377. See id. at 154, 868 P.2d at 117 ("The ordinance does not establish, dissolve, or modify
any legal rights. It merely establishes very general goals governing such issues as development of
urban and rural areas, housing, and transportation ......
378. 124 Wash. 2d 834, 881 P.2d 240 (1994).
379. Id. at 842, 881 P.2d at 245.
380. 83 Wash. App. 574, 922 P.2d 176 (1996).
381. See 83 Wash. App. at 578, 922 P.2d at 179.
382. 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).
383. Id. at 381.
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In a petition to the Board, a citizen group had challenged the
inclusion of several adjacent "urban planned developments" (UPDs)
in the county's UGA. They argued that the UGA designation was
inconsistent with the CPP and violated the Act's UGA requirements.
The Board, upon reconsideration, ruled that the UGA designation did
not comply with the Act because (1) the CPPs were internally incon-
sistent and not binding on the county's UGA designation, and (2) the
county had not adequately justified its inclusion of the UPDs in the
UGA under the Act's UGA requirements. The county appealed the
Board's decision to superior court, claiming that the CPP did direct
the UGA designation and that the county had adequately justified its
designation under GMA's provisions.
In court, the citizens argued that the designation was not directed
by the CPP, but even if it were, it violated the Act's UGA require-
ments. They contended that if CPPs were directive, and conclusive of
the propriety of UGA designations, they would be insulated from
public accountability because only cities and the state may appeal
CPPs to the Board." 4 The trial court and court of appeals rejected the
argument, holding that the county was obligated to designate the
UGA in accordance with the directives of the CPP.385 Accordingly
the court declined to review the designation's compliance with statu-
tory UGA restrictions, effectively holding that actions taken by a
county in accordance with a CPP directive conclusively comply with
statutory requirements.386 By so holding, the court imbued CPPs with
a legal effect not suggested by the GMA.387
However, the state supreme court reversed the court of appeals.
The supreme court agreed that the CPP was directive and binding but
unanimously held that the directive CPP did not immunize the
county's responsive UGA designation from Board review.388 The
court reasoned that this interpretation of the Act was necessary to
achieve consistency with GMA's public participation and UGA des-
ignation requirements.389
The CPPs are explicitly designed to satisfy the GMA require-
ment that the plans and regulations of adjacent cities and counties be
coordinated and consistent.398 In one case, the court held that a county
384. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.210(6).
385. See King County, 91 Wash. App. 1, 16, 951 P.2d 1151, 1159 (1998), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999).
386. See id. at 21, 941 P.2d at 1162.
387. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
388. See King County, 979 P.2d at 381-82.
389. See id.
390. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.100.
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violated this interjurisdictional coordination and consistency require-
ment by using different population projections than a city in negoti-
ating the UGA 9'
K. Comprehensive Plans and Development Regulations
Prior to GMA's adoption, none of Washington's three planning
and zoning enabling acts39 2 clearly required that zoning and other local
regulatory laws be consistent with separately enacted local comprehen-
sive plans. While paying little attention to the differing specific
language in the three enabling acts, the courts rejected the argument
that substantive consistency between zoning regulations and plan pro-
visions was required393 and, for a time, held that only "general con-
formance" was required.394 Then, without overruling the "general
conformance" cases, the courts effectively held that no correspondence
between zoning regulations was required because the plan, as a mere
guide, had no independent legal effect. 9 Thus, zoning regulations
prevailed over inconsistent plan provisions.
It was generally assumed that a purpose and effect of the GMA
was to change the prior law and require consistency between plans and
regulations. The GMA explicitly required that comprehensive plans
meeting exacting requirements be adopted and that development
regulations be consistent with and implement the comprehensive
plan.396 Moreover, the Act separately required that each GMA county
and city "perform its activities and make capital budget decisions in
conformity with the comprehensive plan." '397 Thus, in one case, the
supreme court assumed that a city's regulatory actions must conform
to its comprehensive plan, but upheld the city's action because it had
not yet adopted its plan and, thus, there was "no plan in place to
violate. "398
In another case, the court of appeals relied upon GMA's require-
ment that regulations be consistent with plans in holding that a
community council 99 acted unlawfully.4"0 Community councils have
391. See Diehl v. Mason County, 94 Wash. App. 645,654-55,972 P.2d 543, 547 (1999).
392. WASH. REV. CODE chs. 35.63, 35A.63, and 36.70 (1998).
393. See, e.g., Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Sham-
inghouse v. City of Bellingham, 4 Wash. App. 198, 480 P.2d 233 (1971).
394. See, e.g., Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King County, 96 Wash. 2d 171, 634
P.2d 862 (1981); Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980).
395. See, e.g., Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264
(1988).
396. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(3) and (4).
397. Id. § 36.70A.120.
398. CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wash. 2d 455, 466, 947 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1997).
399. Authorized by WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35.14 (1998).
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statutory authority to disapprove city planning and zoning provi-
sions.4"' The community council had not disapproved the city's plan,
but later rejected zoning provisions adopted to implement the plan.
Apparently reasoning that the statute governing community councils
must be construed to satisfy GMA requirements, the court held that
the council's action violated the Act's requirement that regulations
must be consistent with plans. The court said the community council
would have to have disapproved of city plan provisions in order to
disapprove of their implementing zoning regulations.
The state supreme court confounded land use planners and law-
yers in Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon by seeming-
ly ignoring GMA's consistency requirements and reciting the pre-
GMA rule that regulations prevailed over inconsistent plans.4"2 How-
ever, this was mere dicta because the court did not decide that the
inconsistent zoning, which prohibited the challenged development,
was valid, but rather that a GMA plan provision, which arguably
allowed the development, could not be the sole basis for the city's
approval of the proposal when applicable regulations did not allow
it. 403
Nothing in the GMA provides that plans can be used, without
any implementing regulations, as the sole basis for approving devel-
opment. However, the court acknowledged that a provision of the
1995 regulatory reform statute, RCW 36.70B.030(1), directed local
government to determine, in making project permit decisions, a "pro-
posed project's consistency with applicable development regulations,
or in the absence of applicable regulations, the comprehensive plan."
On the basis of this provision, the project proponents contended that
the plan did allow the project and that the "plan can be used to make a
specific land use decision. '  The court rejected this argument
because "our cases hold otherwise,"4 S explicitly referring to pre-GMA
cases holding that regulations did not have to be consistent with plans.
The court did not interpret or even mention the GMA's consistency
provisions. Thus, the court may not have been denying that GMA
requires consistency between plans and regulations, but may have
been merely construing and applying RCW 36.70B.030(1). This pro-
400. See City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Community Council, 91 Wash. App. 461, 469-
70, 957 P.2d 267, 271-72 (1998).
401. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.14.040 (1998).
402. 133 Wash. 2d 861, 873-74, 947 P.2d 1208, 1215 (1997) (citing Cougar Mountain
Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264 (1988)).
403. See id. at 870, 947 P.2d at 1213.
404. Id. at 872-73, 947 P.2d at 1214.
405. Id. at 873, 947 P.2dat 1214.
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vision authorizes the use of plans in project review only "in the
absence of applicable regulations."4"6 In this case, applicable regula-
tions were not absent. Thus, the statute did not authorize use of the
plan as a basis for project approval.
Of course, the development proponent might have argued that
applicable regulations were absent because they were inconsistent with
the plan and, thus, were void. The court might have rejected this
contention by reasoning that the GMA presumes the validity of plans
and regulations, and that they remain effective absent a Board appeal
and even if a Growth Board has found noncompliance, unless the
Board has issued an invalidity order or the plans and regulations have
been repealed or amended by local government.4 7 Thus, the court
might have reasoned (and might have meant by the unfortunate
language chosen) simply that plans generally do not have independent
regulatory effect. That was the law before GMA,40 8 and it continues
to be the law, subject to the statutory exceptions.4 9 However, the
exceptions apply only when applicable regulations do not exist.41' The
court did not deny or discredit, indeed, did not even mention GMA's
consistency requirement. The court did not say that Growth Boards
lack authority to find implementing regulations, or even preexisting
regulations, noncompliant with the GMA.
In another case, the court acknowledged that implementing
regulations could be found noncompliant and invalidated by the
Growth Boards for inconsistency with UGA designations, which,
when final, become part of comprehensive plans, and that preexisting
regulations could be found noncompliant, (but not "invalid") and
sanctions recommended, for the same reason.41 What if, in this case,
the developer instead had challenged the zoning for inconsistency with
the plan before the Growth Board and had won? Nothing in the
court's reasoning compels the conclusion that the court would have
reversed the Board, and it seems highly unlikely that the court would
have done so.
The court also might have reasoned that the zoning was not
inconsistent with the plan and, thus, the plan clearly could not have
been employed under RCW 36.70B.030(1) because unquestionably
406. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.030(1) (1998).
407. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
408. Comprehensive plans, when incorporated by reference into regulations, become regu-
lations and have regulatory effect. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 (1998); West Main
Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266 (1987).
409. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.030(1).
410. Seeid.
411. See Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash. 2d
542, 958 P.2d 962 (1998).
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valid applicable regulations existed. The court could have found the
underlying zoning consistent because it apparently allowed the same
general uses as the plan contemplated, but at lower levels of develop-
ment intensity. States that require regulations to be consistent with
plans generally do not require that the regulations allow the highest
density or intensity allowed by plans.4"2 If the underlying zoning was
consistent with the plan, the city would not have had authority under
RCW 36.70B.030(1) to apply its plan rather than the more restrictive
zoning regulation.
In sum, while the opinion's language may have been misleading,
the court did not have to decide whether the GMA requires regula-
tions to be consistent with plans. The court merely had to decide that
a plan does not have independent regulatory effect to allow develop-
ment that is prohibited by applicable regulations, unless or until they
have been invalidated under the GMA. RCW 36.70B.030(1) does not
provide to the contrary.1 3
Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County,414 a court of
appeals decision potentially reviewable by the supreme court, has
some similarities with the Mount Vernon case, but critical differences
412. See, e.g., City of Gainesville v. Hope, 377 So. 2d 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 552 P.2d 552 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
413. The alternative argument in support of the city's development approval had nothing
to do with GMA's plan consistency requirement. Rather, the developer argued that, in approv-
ing the planned unit development (PUD), the city rezoned the land, and, thus, the zoning was
consistent with the plan. The court again reached the right decision, but perhaps for the wrong
reason. The court agreed that PUD aporoval constituted a rezone but the rezone was invalid
"spot zoning." The court applied the spot zoning doctrine mechanically and inconsistently with
its recent cases. See, e.g., SANE v. City of Seattle, 101 Wash. 2d 280, 676 P.2d 1006 (1984).
The court acknowledged that the "main inquiry is whether the zoning action bears a substantial
relationship to the general welfare of the affected community," quoting from SANE, and that the
"vice of 'spot zoning' is not the differential regulation of adjacent land but the lack of public
interest justification," citing SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE, supra note 2, § 2.11(c), but
then concluded the rezone was unlawful spot zoning merely because it treated a large parcel of
land differently from its surroundings. See Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount
Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 875-76, 947 P.2d 1208, 1215-16. Because the PUD was consistent
with the city plan, presumably it had public interest justification. At least the court did not
explain why the general welfare was not substantially served by the PUD.
A more appropriate reason for rejecting this argument would have been that the PUD
approval in this case did not rezone the parcel. This is so because PUD approval is a very special
kind of rezone. It locates on the zoning map a "floating zone" provided in the zoning text but
not the map. Under the terms of the text, the "floating zone" can be brought to earth through a
map amendment (rezone) only in specified mapped zones. Since the floating zone text did not
allow the special PUD rezone to occur in the mapped zone of this parcel, the rezone was unlawful
and void. A city must comply with its own regulations until they are legislatively changed by the
city. Here the zoning text of the floating PUD provision did not allow a PUD rezone of this par-
cel. The city did not legislatively amend the PUD text to allow the rezone. Therefore, the city's
attempted quasi-judicial rezone through PUD approval was unlawful.
414. 974 P.2d 863 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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as well. As in Mount Vernon, opponents of a locally approved planned
unit development (PUD) claimed that the project violated the GMA.
In both cases, the local PUD approvals were overturned by the courts,
but under different circumstances and for very different legal reasons.
In Mount Vernon, the zoning regulations did not allow the PUD, and
the court, in effect, held that a plan generally does not have regulatory
effect and could not be the sole basis for regulatory approval before or
after the GMA.415 The court invalidated the city's attempt to give the
plan independent regulatory effect but did not base its decision on the
GMA.416
In Rural Residents, the regulations allowed the PUD, but the
development, with a density of about one dwelling unit per acre, was
proposed on a site outside the interim urban growth area (IUGA).417
Even though the county's IUGA designations had been found non-
compliant with the Act, they had not been invalidated and, thus,
remained in effect. The issue was what the effect of the IUGA was
under these circumstances.
Under the GMA, interim UGAs are explicitly characterized as
development regulations,41s while final UGAs seem to be regarded as
comprehensive plan provisions.419 The Act also provides that UGA
designations, without an "interim" or "final" modifier, are to be
included in comprehensive plans.42° While this provision does not
distinguish between interim and final UGAs, it should be interpreted
as referring only to the latter, because IUGAs are designated before
plan adoption42' and must be finalized "at the time of" plan adop-
422tion. In short, the status of IUGAs under the Act is clear. They are
development regulations. While, under the language of the Act,
arguably final UGAs may metamorphosize into plan provisions, that
intriguing issue was not presented in Rural Residents, because only the
IUGA had been designated.
The developer argued, on the basis of the Mount Vernon case,
that the more specific pre-GMA PUD regulation allowing the pro-
posed development must prevail over the more general GMA defini-
415. See Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 873-74, 947 P.2d at 1214-15.
416. See id.
417. See 974 P.2d at 866.
418. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110(5) ("... [E]ach county shall adopt development
regulations designating interim urban growth areas...").
419. See id. ("Final urban growth areas shall be adopted at the time of comprehensive plan
adoption... ").
420. See id. § 36.70A.110(6) ("Each county shall include designations of urban growth
areas in its comprehensive plan.").
421. See id. § 36.70A.110(5).
422. Id.
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tion of "urban growth."42 The court disagreed, reasoning that Mount
Vernon involved conflict between the city's regulations and the city
plan, while in Rural Residents there was no conflict between the county
regulations and plan, but "between local regulations and a state statute
both defining in their different ways where urban growth is permissi-
ble." '424 Because the "intention behind the mandate for designation of
interim urban growth areas clearly was to prevent urban growth from
occurring in rural areas while the planning process continued,""42 the
court reasoned, the statute's IUGA requirement, in combination with
its definition of "urban growth," prohibited what the county regula-
tions allowed. Where in conflict, a statute prevails over a local ordi-
nance.
The court's actual reasoning is a radical departure from Wash-
ington GMA case law, because it converts a statutory requirement
that counties adopt IUGAs into a self-executing statutory prohibition
of urban development outside of IUGAs. The statute, by its terms,
obligates counties to adopt IUGAs, subject to Growth Board review
and potential invalidation and subject to sanctions for plan provisions
and development regulations violative of the Act.
The statute does not prohibit private urban development outside
of IUGAs. The only way to convert a statutory obligation of counties,
subject to limited Growth Board review and remedies, into a direct
statutory prohibition of private development is through extremely
liberal interpretation to effectuate legislative intent. However, the
legislature did not provide that the Act was to be liberally construed,
as it was riddled with legislative compromise. Thus, the supreme
court has stressed that it will not "legislate" to fill GMA gaps.426
The Rural Residents court's reasoning deviated from most previ-
ous GMA cases, and the court could have used reasoning more con-
sistent with precedent. The court might have reasoned that because
the Act explictly characterizes county IUGA designations as
"development regulations," the conflict was not between local regula-
tions and the legislative intent underlying a broad statutory aspiration,
but between two different county regulations-the IUGA regulation
and the PUD regulation. The court then could have interpreted the
GMA-required county IUGA designation in light of the purposes of
the statutory requirement and could have concluded that the conflict
423. See Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 974 P.2d 863, 869 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999).
424. Id. at 870.
425. Id. at 869.
426. See Skagit Surveyors and Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash. 2d
542, 567, 958 P.2d 962, 974 (1998).
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between the county's IUGA and PUD regulations must be resolved in
favor of the later enactment, both because it was later and because it
was required by state law. The court hinted at such a rationale by
holding that "the designation of an interim urban growth area can
be... an effective development regulation. 4 27  The court did not
articulate the logical conclusion of this characterization.
L. The Legal Effect of GMA Goals
GMA's thirteen broad goals offer a potential basis for expansive
judicial interpretation of GMA's requirements. However, the courts,
conscious of the tenuous legislative balance underlying the Act,
generally have not been inclined to use the goals to convert vague
substantive principles into specific constraints on local discretion.
Thus, in Skagit Surveyors, the first supreme court decision reviewing a
Growth Board decision, the court announced that it would not broadly
construe the Board's power because the legislature carefully delimited
Board authority and did not provide that the Act should be liberally
construed.428
The GMA, as originally enacted, narrowly limited the legal
effect of the goals, prescribing that they "shall be used exclusively for
the purpose of guiding the development of comprehensive plans and
development regulations. 4 29 However, a 1995 amendment gave the
goals a new role by authorizing the Boards to determine "invalidity"
on the basis of whether a noncompliant local plan or regulation would
"substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the goals of this
chapter.""43 And, ironically, a 1997 amendment, designed to reduce
the Boards' substantive authority and increase local policy discretion,
contained language that could be construed to have the opposite effect.
In changing the Boards' standard of review from "preponderance of
the evidence" to the more deferential "clearly erroneous," the amend-
ment provided that a Board must find compliance unless it
"determines that the action by the state, county, or city is clearly
erroneous in view of the entire record before the Board and in light of
the goals and requirements of this chapter. "431 The literal language of
the 1997 amendment provides a basis for the argument that the goals
are not mere "guiding" principles, but substantive standards to be
applied by the Boards. However, given the context of this 1997
427. Association of Rural Residents, 974 P.2d at 869.
428. See Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash. 2d at 558, 958 P.2d at 970.
429. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.020 (amended 1995).
430. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 347 § 110 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.302(1)(b)).
431. 1997 Wash. Laws ch. 429 § 20 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3))
(emphasis added).
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amendment, legislative intent would have to be ignored if it were
construed to elevate the legal status of the GMA goals, effectively
increase state mandate, and reduce local policy discretion.
In one case, the court of appeals, apparently considering only the
statute's literal language, observed that the "GMA clearly allows the
Board to consider both the goals and specific requirements of the
GMA when considering a petition alleging noncompliance. ' 432 The
court confused the authority conferred upon the Boards in 1995 to use
the goals as criteria in deciding whether to impose the new remedy of
"invalidity" with much broader authority to employ the goals as
standards for determining noncompliance. Ironically, the court relied
upon Skagit Surveyors in finding that the Board had implied authority,
even though the supreme court rejected a similar implied authority
argument in that case.433
An apparent attempt to induce the court to transform a GMA
goal into a specific requirement that would have barred an annexation
to the City of Spokane was unsuccessful.434 The court rejected the
argument on the narrow ground that the GMA goals did not have
such prescriptive effect before the city had adopted its GMA plan.
The court might have said that the GMA goals do not have
independent prescriptive legal force at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
Political controversy and compromise riddled the GMA with
vague and wavering lines between state mandate and local discretion.
The Growth Boards, whose members have expertise and experience
extending beyond law to professional planning and policy-making,
occasionally have been inclined to fill legislative gaps to produce a
coherent program of growth management. The legislature has
responded with occasional amendments generally reducing the extent
of state mandate, as construed by the Boards, and increasing local
discretion. The courts, oriented to the rule of law, while appreciative
and supportive of GMA's central purposes and principles, generally
have required GMA's legal effects on local government and private
landowners to be firmly rooted in statutory language. While respectful
of Growth Board expertise, the courts have not hesitated to curtail
expansive interpretations of vague or broad statutory provisions.
Cognizant of the Act's turbulent legislative history, the courts usually
432. Diehl v. Mason County, 94 Wash. App. 645, 660, 973 P.2d 543, 550 (1999).
433. See id.
434. See Glenrose Community Ass'n v. City of Spokane, 93 Wash. App. 839, 971 P.2d 82
(1999).
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have refrained from recognizing specific legal requirements on the
basis of broad legislative intent.
